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CHARTER SCHOOLS, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, 
AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Aaron Saiger0F† 
Regardless whether the American charter school can improve academic 
performance and provide effective alternatives to traditional public schools, 
its steady entrenchment as an institution portends significant, destabilizing 
changes across education law. In no area will its impact be more profound 
than the law of religion and schooling. Despite the general view that charter 
schools are public schools, charters’ neoliberal character—they are privately 
created and managed, and chosen by consumers in a marketplace—makes 
them private schools for Establishment Clause purposes, notwithstanding 
their public subsidy. This conclusion, which rests in substantial part on the 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris vouchers case, implies that very substantial 
amounts of government money could be directed towards religious 
institutions as the charter sector expands. State decisions to permit or forbid 
religious chartering will determine the magnitude of this shift. But even 
states seeking to forbid religious chartering will find that the bottom-up, 
market-oriented structure of chartering invites religiously oriented 
educational entrepreneurs and parents to exploit the fuzziness of the 
categories “religion” and “school” in order to undermine such a ban. 
Practical and constitutional constraints upon the regulatory tools that the 
neoliberal paradigm makes available to states—rulemaking and exercising 
bureaucratic discretion when approving and renewing charters—ensure 
that efforts to abolish religion in charters will enjoy only partial success. 
 
 †  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful for insightful 
comments I received from Bruce Cooper, Nestor Davidson, Annie Decker, Richard Garnett, 
Abner Greene, Russ Pearce, James Ryan, Nelson Tebbe, and Amy Uelman, and to audiences at 
Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law and King’s College London. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How, and to what extent, may government support religious 
practices in public schools? In private schools? These are famous 
questions of American constitutional law. The Supreme Court has 
addressed them by posing two other questions: What sorts of religious 
practices? What kind of support? The answers to these latter questions 
are the grist for the multifactor tests and judgment calls that yield 
answers to the former. So: students may pray in private school, but in 
public school permissibility depends upon what sort of prayer, when 
and where it occurs, who conducts and sponsors it, and what sorts of 
physical or psychological coercion its context might exert upon pupils.1 
 
 1 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
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Public schools are funded by public monies, but whether a state may 
lend support to a private religious school depends on the form the aid 
takes. If cash, the method and route by which subsidy reaches school is 
determinative;2 if materials, what matters is whether the loaned 
materials most resemble books, maps, or films, how the materials will be 
used, and by whom.3 
In sharp contrast, constitutional lawyers have generally not asked: 
What is a public school? A private school? Instead, federal constitutional 
law has treated public and private, as those terms are used to describe 
schools, as self-defining. Public schools are the state-sponsored ones, 
run by the local elected school board, open to all local children, and 
supported with tax dollars. Private schools are, well, the private ones. 
They are run by entrepreneurs or like-minded individuals, supported by 
tuition and private charity, and need not educate any particular child 
beyond duties created by enrollment contracts and the dictates of 
conscience. Only a handful of Supreme Court cases—most notably the 
ten-year-old school vouchers case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris—say 
anything at all about how to distinguish between public and private 
schools.4 But making this distinction has rapidly become urgent as a 
paradigm shift accelerates in American educational governance. 
For many decades Progressivism defined the status quo in 
American schools. Progressive educational reformers viewed schools as 
government instrumentalities, paid for and managed by the state, free of 
charge, and common to all. Progressive schools rely for both legitimacy 
and mission upon the concept of citizenship: they are popularly elected, 
democratically accountable, and teach democratic values. Progressive 
education enjoyed extraordinary success, and was nearly completely 
dominant in the United States by the second half of the twentieth 
century. The result was a dichotomous industry in which public schools 
were a particular kind of school—the Progressive kind—and private 
schools were the way in which people, for various reasons, opted out of 
the civic enterprise of education.5 
 
(1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 2 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 
(1983); cf. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011) (finding no 
taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause challenge to a tax credit for religious school 
tuition). 
 3 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802–03 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion); 
EMMA LONG, THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE: RELIGION, EDUCATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE IN POST WAR AMERICA 57–58 (2012); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the 
Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 155, 164 & nn.44–46 (2004) (gathering cases). 
 4 536 U.S. 639; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
 5 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), finds a constitutionally guaranteed 
parental right to purchase schooling privately. Pierce permits government to regulate private 
schools very substantially, although it may not co-opt their private character. See id. at 534. 
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In recent years neoliberal approaches have challenged 
Progressivism and undermined its ideological hegemony. Neoliberalism 
prefers markets to bureaucracies and elevates consumer sovereignty in 
place of citizenship. It understands education to be a service provided by 
the market, one whose quality is enhanced by competitive pressure, and 
to which the criterion of economic efficiency—giving people what they 
want—should have full application. The merits of such ideas are widely 
and fiercely debated. In this project, however, I accept neoliberalism as 
substantially entrenched, and focus instead upon its consequences. 
That neoliberalism is here to stay is vividly demonstrated by 
America’s burgeoning charter school sector. Charters are the leading 
form of neoliberal education in the United States today, educating 1.6 
million American schoolchildren. These schools share important 
features of traditional public schools. They are publicly funded and 
must accept all applicants (or, if oversubscribed, admit students by 
lottery). But charters are neoliberal at their heart. They are privately 
established and managed. Their public subsidies are per-student and 
granted only insofar as individual families choose to enroll their 
children in the charter. Charters therefore must adapt to market 
demands. 
In no area of education law will the destabilizing impact of 
neoliberalism be more profound than in the law of religion and 
schooling. The well-established principle that public schools must be 
secular but private schools are free to be religious is an artifact of the 
contingent intersection in time between the era of uncontested 
Progressive hegemony and the Court’s elaboration of modern First 
Amendment law. That principle, entirely adequate when all schools are 
either public in the Progressive sense or fully private, is not easily 
applied in a neoliberal world. Does the charter school, publicly funded, 
publicly regulated, nominally open to all, but privately run and 
dependent on private choices, fall on the public or private side of the 
legal line? 
I conclude, against the popular, political, and scholarly consensus, 
that charter schools may simultaneously accept public subsidy and 
engage in religious activity. Where private groups organize schools that 
compete to attract students, those schools, for Establishment Clause 
purposes, are private schools. This conclusion is both compelled by the 
Court’s cases, especially the Zelman vouchers case—which most recent 
commentators dismiss as a dead end in education law—and consistent 
with broader principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
The ongoing expansion of chartering could therefore direct very 
substantial amounts of government money toward religious schooling. 
How much depends in large part, but not entirely, upon the states. I 
argue that states can choose to permit or forbid religious chartering. But 
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even states that choose the latter will find that their control over schools’ 
religious activity is more limited in a neoliberal world than in a 
Progressive one. The bottom-up, market-oriented structure of 
chartering invites religiously-oriented educational entrepreneurs and 
parents to exploit the fuzziness of the categories “religion” and “school” 
in order to undermine such a ban.6 The regulatory tools that the 
neoliberal paradigm makes available to states—rulemaking and 
exercising bureaucratic discretion when approving and renewing 
charter applications—are unequal to the task of fully secularizing 
charter schools. 
For example, some religious educators have spun charters off from 
private religious schools, shedding their explicit religiosity but retaining 
aspects of religious culture and preserving structural connections with 
their predecessors. Such charters have enrolled their mother schools’ 
students, repurposed their facilities, hired their teaching staff, and 
constituted overlapping boards of directors. Other charters, both spun 
off and brand new, have used charters’ ability to emphasize particular 
themes to create schools that focus upon the culture and language of 
specific religious minorities. These schools eschew parochially 
“religious” instruction but teach religious languages and cultures, and 
accommodate but do not advocate religious practices. Even more 
creatively, some private religious schools have co-enrolled their students 
in cyber charter schools. Taking advantage of cyber-students’ ability to 
sign into cyber-school asynchronously and from places of their 
choosing, such schools in this way transfer to the state the provision and 
payment for secular education, even as they guarantee that this 
education will continue to take place in a fully religious context. Each of 
these kinds of schools is formally secular, but nevertheless incorporates 
important correlates of religious schooling unavailable in traditional 
public schools. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the rise of 
Progressivism and the neoliberal challenge, epitomized by the charter 
school movement. Part II canvasses sources of law outside the religion 
clauses regarding whether charters are properly categorized as public or 
private schools, but concludes that these determinations carry only 
slight weight in the First Amendment context. Part III makes the 
argument that, for religion clause purposes, charter schools are private 
schools that may engage in religious activity, notwithstanding state 
subsidy. Part IV demonstrates that states retain the option to restrict 
religious expression in charter schools, but that substantial regulatory 
and constitutional constraints face states that choose to do so. Part V 
concludes with some observations regarding how the neoliberal turn, 
 
 6 See infra Part IV.B. 
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intended to reshape the relationship between schools, bureaucracies, 
and parents, will perturb the always-fraught equilibrium between 
schooling and faith in America. 
I.     THE PROGRESSIVE SCHOOL AND ITS COMPETITORS 
A.     The Progressive Public School 
The way that American states organize schools has its roots in the 
late 1800s, in reforms introduced by common-school advocates and 
then perfected by Progressive educators. Progressives, with 
extraordinary energy and success, displaced “voluntary and incidental” 
community-based schools across the country in favor of their preferred 
vision of education.7 The major features of Progressive education 
continue to limn American public schooling today. All children must 
attend some school, either public or private. Attendance at a free public 
school within one’s local district is as of right.8 Public school districts 
are local governments,9 whose local electorates select their governing 
boards and ratify their budgets. The elected board delegates 
implementation to a professionalized and bureaucratized staff.10 
Districts tax and spend, hire and fire. Their programs are secular.11 
Instead of sending their children, for free, to the local public 
school, parents can opt out in favor of private education. Private schools 
are self-governing. They support themselves not through taxation but 
with tuition and donations.12 They can teach, or eschew, religion at their 
discretion. They have no obligation to educate any particular child 
beyond duties created by enrollment contracts or the dictates of 
conscience. Government regulates them fairly minimally. 
 
 7 DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 
6–7, 16 (1974). Progressives achieved dominance in some states substantially earlier. See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 2006-Ohio-5512 ¶ 28, 857 
N.E.2d 1148, 1157. 
 8 See Julie A. Reuben, Patriotic Purposes: Public Schools and the Education of Citizens, in 
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 11–12 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds. 2005); Aaron Saiger, 
The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 500 & n.24 (2010). 
 9 There are over 14,000 districts nationwide, a number greatly diminished by district 
consolidation since the pre-Progressive era. MICHAEL B. BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, TEN 
THOUSAND DEMOCRACIES: POLITICS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOL DISTRICTS 15 
(2005); Thomas Corcoran & Margaret Goertz, The Governance of Public Education, in THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 25, 33–34. 
 10 See TYACK, supra note 7, at 131–32; Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 9, at 32. 
 11 EDGAR L. MORPHET, ROE L. JOHNS & THEODORE L. RELLER, EDUCATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND ISSUES 5–7 (4th ed. 1982). 
 12 STEVEN L. JONES, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA: PRIVATE EDUCATION AND PUBLIC 
LIFE 3 (2008). 
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Schooling need not be organized in this fashion. Prior to the 
twentieth century, in the United States “[t]he terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
did not have their present connotations, and most schools did not fit 
neatly into either of our modern categories.”13 In the 1800s, a 
smorgasbord of schooling arrangements were understood to serve a 
“public” function but “by contemporary standards . . . were private 
institutions,” including privately managed schools that received public 
funds.14 Cooperative arrangements for school purposes between states 
and private entities, including religious groups, persisted well into the 
twentieth century.15 The meanings of the terms shifted with time: 
“Although modern distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ became 
more common in the North by mid-century, this change was slow and 
uneven.”16 Indeed, when Progressive-era reformers attacked the 
institution of the “private” school, by the term they meant something 
different than what Americans reflexively understood it to mean in, say, 
the 1960s or 1990s.17 Today’s American idea of what makes a public 
school is highly contingent.18 
Nevertheless, by the latter half of the twentieth century 
Progressivism had achieved ideological “hegemony” in America.19 The 
Progressive public school was long the “taken-for-granted educative 
institution for most Americans,”20 education’s “one best system.”21 Like 
the free press, it was a fundamental “institution of American 
constitutional democracy” (although mentioned nowhere in the 
Constitution).22 Its particular characteristics, and their bundling into a 
single institution, have been a fixed point in public understanding for 
decades. They remain so today. Artists across generations easily evoke a 
 
 13 CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 13 (1983); accord STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 253 (2010); TYACK, supra note 7, at 
57. 
 14 Reuben, supra note 8, at 5; cf. JAMES C. CARPER & THOMAS C. HUNT, THE DISSENTING 
TRADITION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 172 (2007) (listing arguments in favor of public funding 
of Catholic schools because such schools, inter alia, would “contribute to the public good”). 
 15 See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 57 (2010). 
 16 WILLIAM J. REESE, HISTORY, EDUCATION, AND THE SCHOOLS 100 (2007). 
 17 See id. at 99–102; KAESTLE, supra note 13, at 116. 
 18 “Public” and “private” also bear variable meanings cross-nationally. Nations’ diverse 
approaches to public/private and church/state lines in education belie any argument that 
Progressive institutions are necessary for secular democracy. See 1 CHARLES L. GLENN & JAN DE 
GROOF, BALANCING FREEDOM, AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION 53, 60, 93, 
101, 104–05 (2005). 
 19 JONES, supra note 12, at 2. 
 20 Id. at 4. 
 21 See generally TYACK, supra note 7. 
 22 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Public Schools as an Institution of American Constitutional 
Democracy, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at xiii; cf. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION 
OF HENRY ADAMS 33 (1918) (equating the press and the school as fundamental institutions). 
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public school by sketching just a few of its classic markers—the hapless 
principal, the against-all-odds teacher, the befuddled board, diverse and 
distracted students—whether in a Norman Rockwell painting,23 
immigrant novel,24 teen sitcom,25 or Hollywood tearjerker.26 The bundle 
of policies that define the institutional structure of the Progressive 
public school, however historically contingent, is deeply embedded in 
American life and culture. 
Particularly important for this Article, during the second half of the 
twentieth century, when the Court was most active regarding religion 
and schools,27 Progressive influence was at its apogee. Progressivism did 
not itself demand secularism; it opposed “sectarianism,” in the sense of 
taking sides in internecine disputes among Protestants, but was 
untroubled by pan-Protestant, nondenominational Christian 
religiosity.28 Requirements that public schools be fairly rigorously 
secular were imposed by the judiciary, not by the Progressives. 
Nevertheless, it was critical that the Court undertook to elaborate 
law on the topic in a fully Progressive context. The Court’s cases, along 
with treatises and monographs on religion and schooling, therefore did, 
and still do, treat the public schools as an axiomatic category requiring 
no exposition. Although they described, often at length, the historical 
development of public schools,29 they gave no attention to defining 
“public school.” (This approach is in stark contrast with their treatment 
 
 23 NORMAN ROCKWELL, SCHOOL TEACHER (HAPPY BIRTHDAY MISS JONES, TEACHER’S 
SURPRISE) (1956), available at http://store.nrm.org/browse.cfm/4,3007.html.  
 24 E.g., HENRY ROTH, CALL IT SLEEP (1934); HERMAN WOUK, CITY BOY: THE ADVENTURES 
OF HERBIE BOOKBINDER (1948); BEL KAUFMAN, UP THE DOWN STAIRCASE (1964). 
 25 E.g., Room 222 (20th Century Fox Television premiered 1969); Welcome Back Kotter 
(The Komack Co. Inc. premiered 1975); Head of the Class (Warner Bros. Television premiered 
1986); Beverly Hills 90210 (90210 Productions premiered 1990); Glee (20th Century Fox 
Television premiered 2009). 
 26 The modal plot pits a driven teacher’s love of learning against the twin scourges of teen 
anomie and official indifference. E.g., THE BLACKBOARD JUNGLE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
1955); UP THE DOWN STAIRCASE (Park Place Production 1967); STAND AND DELIVER (Warner 
Bros. Pictures 1988); DANGEROUS MINDS (Hollywood Pictures 1995); MR. HOLLAND’S OPUS 
(Hollywood Pictures 1996); see also Philip French, Au Revoir, Monsieur Frites, THE OBSERVER, 
Mar. 1, 2009. 
 27 KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 17 (2005) [hereinafter 
GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG]; MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF 
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 85 (2010). 
 28 See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH 
THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 30–32 (2012) [hereinafter GREEN, BIBLE, 
SCHOOL, AND CONSTITUTION]; LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC 
SCHOOL, 1825–1925, at 20–23 (1987); LONG, supra note 3, at 88; George M. Thomas, Lisa R. 
Peck & Channin G. De Haan, Reforming Education, Transforming Religion, 1876–1931, in THE 
SECULAR REVOLUTION 355, 359–60, 378–79 (Christian Smith ed. 2003). 
 29 VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
§ 1:05 (2d ed. 2010); GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 13–17; MARTHA M. 
MCCARTHY & NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND 
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 28–29 (1987); RICHARD C. MCMILLAN, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
AN INTRODUCTION 79–89 (1984). 
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of their other basic category, “religion.”30) Until the vouchers case, 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,31 the Court itself used “public school” 
without even gesturing towards the possible utility of a definition. In the 
reigning educational context, this was reasonable: the universe of 
schools consisted on the one hand of Progressive-style public schools, 
both funded and managed by the state, and classically private schools on 
the other, neither state-funded nor state-managed.32 Hybrid forms, such 
as charters, were out of mind. 
B.     The Neoliberal Challenge and Its Critics 
David Harvey, in his Brief History of Neoliberalism, captures the 
departure from Progressive education that underlies reforms like school 
vouchers and charter schools when he defines his subject as follows: 
Neoliberalism is . . . a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.33 
Charters and vouchers replace public sovereignty exercised by local 
citizens, which characterizes Progressive education, with consumer 
sovereignty exercised by parents shopping for the school that they think 
best suits their children.34 And they supplant Progressive governmental 
management, whose core institutions are citizenship, elections, 
bureaucracies, and professionalism, with private management. 
Neoliberal schools live or die based upon market forces. Neoliberals 
argue that markets and market-like institutions can distribute goods 
based on private preferences with much greater efficiency, and 
correspondingly less welfare loss, than public provision; moreover, they 
are relatively less burdened by the shortcomings associated with public 
bureaucracies.35 
 
 30 See GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 116–20; MCMILLAN, supra note 
29, at 57. 
 31 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 32 See GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 17–18. 
 33 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005). 
 34 See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American 
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 842, 845 (2011) [hereinafter Minow, Seduction of Choice]. 
 35 JOHN MERRIFIELD, THE SCHOOL CHOICE WARS 6–7, 10 (2001); Christopher Lubienski, 
Innovation in Education Markets: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Competition and 
Choice in Charter Schools, 40 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 395, 396 (2003). 
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In the educational context, neoliberalism found its contemporary 
voice in the 1990s.36 Growing disenchantment with educational 
outcomes in traditional public schools made room for the neoliberal 
argument that market-based schooling enjoys structural comparative 
advantages over state-provided schooling.37 Schools forced to be 
responsive to a marketplace would have no choice but to generate 
academic achievement.38 The bureaucratic, state-run school, by 
contrast, faces no consequences for failure and therefore lacks incentives 
to succeed.39 
Educational neoliberals first concentrated, following the early lead 
of Milton Friedman, upon school vouchers.40 Vouchers are government 
subsidies that can be directed either to private or public schools, at 
parents’ discretion. Early voucher programs ineluctably led to the 
commingling of issues of neoliberal education reform and of 
Establishment, because the pool of private schools prepared to accept 
the relatively small vouchers available through those programs was 
largely religious.41 After the Supreme Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris that vouchers could constitutionally be issued to private, 
religious-school pupils, however, an expected wave of voucher programs 
never materialized.42 Conventional wisdom suggests that vouchers 
attracted few Americans, who are mostly content with their own public 
schools (even if worried about public schooling generally) and 
uninterested in siphoning school funds to the private sector, especially 
at the scale required to make the vouchers broadly attractive.43 But this 
account, even on its own terms, is too glib. Vouchers continue to find 
 
 36 See PATRICIA BURCH, HIDDEN MARKETS: THE NEW EDUCATION PRIVATIZATION 5 
(2009). 
 37 Jacob B. Michaelsen, A Public Choice Perspective on Public Schooling, in PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 63 (William Lowe Boyd & 
James G. Cibulka eds. 1989). 
 38 See Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educational 
Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 850–51 (1999) [hereinafter McConnell, Governments, Families, 
and Power]. 
 39 See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS (1990). 
 40 See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (R.A. Solo ed. 1955). 
 41 The proper characterization of the relationship between religious interests and voucher 
advocacy is disputed. Some insist that public aid to religious schools was the primary 
motivation for vouchers while others contend that vouchers primarily sought to improve 
school quality. Compare Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 829–31, with Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also James Forman, Jr., 
The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story of Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
547, 547 (2007). 
 42 DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW 
TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 120–21 (2010). 
 43 See Forman, supra note 41, at 549–50; Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 832–
33. 
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life in various statehouses, the United States Congress, and political 
campaigns, suggesting that the issue retains political salience.44 Perhaps 
more important, especially after Zelman bestowed upon them the 
imprimatur of constitutionality, vouchers helped to normalize the 
market-oriented partial privatization of schooling and make it seem less 
alarming. This intellectual and ideological groundwork paved the way 
for the rise of the charter school, the most ubiquitous and important 
educational reform of the contemporary American scene. 
Charters, like vouchers, hold out the neoliberal promise that 
competition and entrepreneurialism can produce better educational 
results than hierarchy, monopoly, and decision making through 
politics.45 Charter schools do share important features with traditional 
public schools. In addition to a self-image that places them within, 
rather than outside, of the public school system,46 they do not admit 
privately paying students and may not charge tuition.47 Only in some 
states are charters exempt from the collective bargaining agreements 
reached by their local school districts with teachers and other staff.48 
Charters are also prohibited from discriminating among students in 
admission.49 Oversubscribed charters must admit students by lottery,50 
although there is perennial concern that they use strategies such as 
location, targeted advertising, and counseling students at enrollment 
and re-enrollment to shape their student bodies to their liking.51 
Nevertheless charters are neoliberal at heart. In charters’ ideal form 
(state regulations vary), any group that meets basic requirements may 
organize a charter school and solicit students.52 Families may then 
 
 44 Sean Cavanagh, State GOP Lawmakers Push to Expand Vouchers; Some Legislation 
Would Extend Eligibility to Middle-Income Families, EDUC. WK., Apr. 27, 2011, at 22; Lyndsey 
Layton & Philip Rucker, Romney Endorses Education Vouchers, WASH. POST, May 24, 2012, at 
A04; Mary Ann Zehr, Capacity Issues Loom as Voucher Support Surges, EDUC. WK., June 15, 
2011, at 1 (reporting new, expanded, or potential voucher programs in the District of 
Columbia, Indiana, Wisconsin, Florida, and Pennsylvania). 
 45 See generally JEFFREY R. HENIG, SPIN CYCLE: HOW RESEARCH IS USED IN POLICY 
DEBATES: THE CASE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS (2008); MERRIFIELD, supra note 35; TAKING 
MEASURE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: BETTER ASSESSMENTS, BETTER POLICYMAKING, BETTER 
SCHOOLS (Julian R. Betts & Paul T. Hill eds., 2010). 
 46 See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 47 See Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes That 
Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 367 (2003) (noting this principle 
and occasional exceptions thereto). 
 48 See R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY, 
EQUITY, AND DIVERSITY 6 (2010). 
 49 See Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The Gate-
Keeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2001). 
 50 For typical requirements for open or random enrollment, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15-184(A) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 9-102(3), 9-102.1(b) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 51 Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, Choice, Integration, and Educational 
Opportunity: Evidence on Competitive Incentives for Student Sorting in Charter Schools, 12 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 351, 361 (2009). 
 52 See CHESTER E. FINN, JR., BRUNO V. MANNO & GREGG VANOUREK, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 
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choose among traditional public school(s) for which they are eligible 
and available charter schools. By enrolling in a charter, a student 
redirects from her local public school to the charter some substantial 
portion of the government subsidy that the former school would 
otherwise have received on her behalf. In exchange for accepting market 
discipline (supplemented by regulatory requirements to demonstrate 
adequate student achievement53), charters are exempted from much but 
not all the regulatory apparatus that constrains traditional public 
schools.54 They are regulated much less invasively than traditional 
public schools with respect to such matters as curriculum, organization, 
and discipline.55 Many states do exempt charters from collective 
bargaining with teachers.56 Within whatever regulatory strictures are 
imposed, charters compete for students with other charters and with 
other types of schools. If students enroll, a charter thrives. Otherwise it 
dies.57 
The charter sector is growing explosively. In 2009–2010, 1.6 
million children were enrolled in 5000 charter schools, making charters 
five percent of all public schools.58 By comparison, 500,000 children 
were enrolled in 2000 charters in 2000, and there were no charter 
schools in 1990.59 Fifteen school districts enroll at least a quarter of all 
public-school students in charters, including big-city districts in New 
Orleans, Detroit, the District of Columbia, Kansas City (MO), St. Louis, 
Cleveland, San Antonio, and Indianapolis.60 Most government-funded 
schools in New Orleans are now charter schools;61 other large districts, 
including Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, and Miami-
Dade, enroll more than ten percent of their students in charters.62 Public 
school districts in these and other cities are complaining about the 
 
ACTION: RENEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 15 (2000). 
 53 Arnold F. Shober, Paul Manna & John F. White, Flexibility Meets Accountability: State 
Charter School Laws and Their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United 
States, 45 POL’Y STUD. J. 563, 566 (2006). 
 54 See MARK SCHNEIDER, PAUL TESKE & MELISSA MARSCHALL, CHOOSING SCHOOLS: 
CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 26 (2000). 
 55 See GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 48, at 6. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 876 (having “satisfied customers” 
necessary, though insufficient, for a charter school); Sandra Vergari, Charter Schools: A 
Significant Precedent in Public Education, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 495, 500 (2003).  
 58 INST. OF EDUC. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, at 22 
(2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf. 
 59 JOSEPH MURPHY & CATHERINE DUNN SHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE 
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 28–29 (2002). 
 60 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST 
CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITIES 3 (7th ed. 2012). 
 61 See generally Robert Garda, The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from New Orleans, 
40 J.L. & EDUC. 57 (2011). 
 62 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., supra note 60, at 3. 
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sizable bite charters are taking from their traditional enrollments.63 The 
two most recent presidents, one of each party, have been charter 
boosters. The possibility that chartering will fizzle out seems remote.64 
Fierce debates rage over neoliberalism generally, over neoliberal 
education, and over charters in particular. In some quarters 
neoliberalism is a fighting word. It is the agenda of those who would 
privatize the public, quantify the incommensurable, and privilege the 
one percent.65 After offering the definition that begins this Section, 
David Harvey quickly reminds his readers that neoliberalism primarily 
has been “a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.”66 
Such critiques need not take such doctrinaire forms. Michael 
Sandel recently criticized what he views as an undesirable progression 
from a “market economy” to a “market society”; his subtitle (“The 
Moral Limits of Markets”) suggests what he thinks of over-
marketization.67 Sandel, although he says nothing about neoliberalism 
and focuses on the buying and selling of goods that once had no price, 
recapitulates two standard critiques of an over-marketized society. First, 
it privileges the affluent: “Where all good things are bought and sold, 
having money makes all the difference in the world.”68 Second, Sandel 
notes the “corrosive” if “difficult to describe” problem that “[p]utting a 
price on the good things in life can corrupt them.”69 Not all things 
should be commodified.70 The synthesis of private provision and public 
funding that characterizes governmental privatization initiatives also 
has more technocratic critics, who worry that outsourcing can have the 
effect of “[u]ndermining democratic norms of transparency, rationality, 
and accountability” and “diminish[ing] government capacity.”71 
These arguments are instantiated in debates over schooling. In 
making their case, critics of charters (and, a fortiori, of voucher 
programs) adopt the notable rhetorical strategy of playing up the 
 
 63 Motoko Rich, Enrollment Off in Big Districts, Forcing Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012, 
at A1. 
 64 JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR HYPE? 3 (2007). 
 65 See Stanley Fish, Neoliberalism and Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG, 
(Mar. 8, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/neoliberalism-and-
higher-education. 
 66 HARVEY, supra note 33, at 19; accord HENRY A. GIROUX, AGAINST THE TERROR OF 
NEOLIBERALISM: POLITICS BEYOND THE AGE OF GREED 10 (2008) (“[Neoliberalism] is an 
ideology that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market 
economy.”). 
 67 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012). 
 68 Id. at 8. 
 69 Id. at 9. 
 70 Id.; accord HARVEY, supra note 33, at 33 (“Neoliberalization has meant, in short, the 
financialization of everything.”). 
 71 Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction to GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 5 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
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public/private distinction. They argue that charters are not a species of 
public school reform but instead an attack upon “public schooling” 
itself, and thereby upon the public good. Michael Apple objects to 
“powerful interests” that, by advocating consumer choice in schooling, 
seek to destroy “unions, collective freedom, the common good, 
politics, . . . [and] collective deliberation.”72 Indeed, he accuses 
“neoliberal segments of the new hegemonic alliance”73 in education of 
seeking “to radically alter who we think we are”74 and to “transfor[m] 
our very idea of democracy, making it only an economic concept, not a 
political one.”75 Part and parcel with the “entire project of 
neoliberalism,” market-based educational reform “is connected to a 
larger process of exporting the blame from the decisions of dominant 
groups onto the state and onto poor people.”76 
Unlike the general debate over neoliberalism, where wholesale 
condemnation on the far left coexists with positions like Sandel’s 
opposition to over-marketization and over-privatization, in the 
educational debate many mainstream observers argue in ways 
substantively indistinguishable from that of the most strident critics. 
Diane Ravitch, repenting of her earlier neoliberal sympathies, is 
substantially less altiloquent than Apple but echoes his complaint that 
“[f]or neoliberals, the world in essence is a vast supermarket.”77 She 
complains, “[t]he rhetoric of many charter school advocates has come to 
sound uncannily similar to the rhetoric of voucher proponents and of 
the most rabid haters of public schooling. They often sound as though 
they want public schools to fail.”78 She concludes that: 
 
 72 MICHAEL W. APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY: MARKETS, STANDARDS, GOD, AND 
INEQUALITY 9 (2001) [hereinafter APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY]. For similar voices, 
consider MICHAEL FABRICANT & MICHELLE FINE, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE CORPORATE 
MAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: WHAT’S AT STAKE? 8 (2012) (stating that charters “have 
started to rip communities of color apart”); PAULINE LIPMAN, THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF URBAN EDUCATION: NEOLIBERALISM, RACE, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 6–15 (2011); 
JAMES RYAN, STRUGGLING FOR INCLUSION: EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN A NEOLIBERAL 
WORLD 30, 34 (2012) (this James Ryan is not the education scholar James E. Ryan of the 
University of Virginia); William H. Watkins, Re-imagining Public Education, in THE ASSAULT 
ON PUBLIC EDUCATION: CONFRONTING THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE SCHOOL REFORM 189, 189 
(William H. Watkins ed. 2012) (“Corporate, privatizer, free-marketeer, ‘bankster’ neoliberals 
are working feverishly to create a narrative for 21st-century education.”); see also James 
Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence from Fifteen 
Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 841 (collecting further examples 
of similar rhetoric). 
 73 APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY, supra note 72, at 33. 
 74 Id. at 8. 
 75 Id. at 15; accord LIPMAN, supra note 72, at 121–22 (“Charter schools have become the 
central vehicle to . . . eliminate whatever democratic control of public education there is.”); 
Kenneth J. Saltman, Putting the Public Back in Public Schooling: Public Schools Beyond the 
Corporate Model, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 9, 24 (2009). 
 76 APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY, supra note 72, at 32. 
 77 Id. 
 78 RAVITCH, supra note 42, at 146; accord FABRICANT & FINE, supra note 72, at 123 
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[T]he problem with the marketplace is that it dissolves communities 
and replaces them with consumers. Going to school is not the same 
as going shopping . . . . The market serves us well when we want to 
buy a pair of shoes or a new car or a can of paint; we can shop 
around for the best value or the style we like. The market is not the 
best way to deliver public services. Just as every neighborhood should 
have a reliable fire station, every neighborhood should have a good 
public school.79 
This wholesale rejection of the neoliberal project in education is 
striking. What makes it so clear to these thoughtful and informed 
writers that government provision is necessary to education when other 
programs guaranteeing important and basic services—food stamps, for 
example—operate relatively uncontroversially on a neoliberal 
paradigm? Why oppose market provision for schooling in principle? I 
do not mean to suggest that there are no answers to these questions. 
Particularly important is the claim that education is uniquely needful of 
public provision because of deep connections between education and 
the practice of public democracy.80 My point here is that many critics 
feel little rhetorical need to make any argument. They assert, rather than 
justify, the incompatibility of marketization and the public good. It is 
obvious to them that public schools that are public in a Progressive way 
are public in the right way, because that is how public schools have been 
public for nearly a century. That they argue thus, and expect to be 
effective, is testament to the success and deep roots of educational 
Progressivism in America. 
The debates over neoliberalism are extremely important, but I do 
not join them here. This Article is unusual in using the term 
“neoliberal” as a purely neutral description without normative 
implications. Their wisdom aside, charters and other neoliberal reforms 
are now substantially entrenched.81 Educational neoliberalism is 
 
(“Charter reform . . . neglect[s] the fundamental obligation of every publicly funded institution 
to remain accountable to the citizenry financing its work, accessible to those in need of its 
services, and just in allocating resources.”). 
 79 RAVITCH, supra note 42, at 221. 
 80 See GIROUX, supra note 66, at 114–17. Public schools in the Progressive tradition have 
also long arrogated to themselves, qua democratic and public polities, a particular duty to 
prepare students for civic life and democratic citizenship, while cultivating doubts about 
whether private schools can prepare students similarly. James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt, 
Taking Religion Seriously: Another Approach, 38 RELIGION & EDUC. 81, 86 (2011); Charles 
Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 168 (2002); 
William A. Galston, The Politics of Polarization: Education Debates in the United States, in THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 57, 63; Reuben, supra note 8, at 12–13; Saiger, supra note 8, at 
521–23; Paul Weithman, Religious Education and Democratic Character, in RELIGIOUS VOICES 
IN PUBLIC PLACES 194, 205–07 (Nigel Biggar & Linda Hogan eds. 2009). Such arguments did 
not originate with the Progressives and have roots in the pre-revolutionary and founding 
periods. See GREEN, BIBLE, SCHOOL, AND CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 13–15. 
 81 See BURCH, supra note 36, at 2–3. 
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unlikely to vanquish Progressivism, but has already displaced its 
ideological monopoly in law, on the ground, and in the culture,82 and 
will continue to compete with it for the foreseeable future. How 
neoliberal schools will affect various aspects of American educational 
governance and law has become critically important. This Article 
focuses on a single but vital aspect of this larger question: How will the 
rise of charters affect the legal regulation of religion in American 
education? 
II.     THE CHARTER SCHOOL UNDER A PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
As Part I demonstrates, charter schools are in fact public/private 
hybrids,83 routinely described as “publicly funded but privately run” or 
“public but largely independent.”84 But charters confront a First 
Amendment regime that insists upon dichotomy. Public schools face 
one set of constitutional rules about religion and private schools 
another. This is because—although the institution of public schooling 
and the phrase “public school” are famously absent from the United 
States Constitution85—the Supreme Court’s cases interpret the First 
Amendment to bar much religious activity in “public schools” while 
leaving private schools free to pursue religious missions.86 The duality is 
rooted in the state action requirement, the basic principle that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments constrain governments but not private 
persons. 
It therefore becomes tempting to think that one can identify which 
First Amendment rules apply to charter schools by determining whether 
charters are public or private. On this approach, if charters are public 
schools, then they are required to be secular.87 This Part argues that, to 
the contrary, whether a school is public school or a state actor is a 
context-dependent inquiry. Whether charters are public or private need 
not be answered identically for all purposes, for all constitutional 
purposes, or even for all federal constitutional purposes. “[W]hen state 
 
 82 See Fried, supra note 80, at 168. 
 83 Christopher Lubienski, Instrumental Perspectives on the “Public” in Public Education: 
Incentives and Purposes, 17 EDUC. POL’Y 478, 482–83 (2003) [hereinafter Lubienski, 
Instrumental Perspectives]. 
 84 See Mead, supra note 47, at 352; Foundations Help Charter Network Secure Bonds, EDUC. 
WK., May 12, 2010, at 4. 
 85 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973). 
 86 GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 17–18. 
 87 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 874–75. Only rarely in the literature does 
one encounter even glancing references to the possibility that charter schools could be religious. 
See Laycock, supra note 3, at 184–85. 
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action is found in a particular context, it doesn’t mean that the actor is a 
state actor in all contexts.”88 
In the educational arena, this principle was long obscured by the 
Progressive hegemony that limited the variety of institutional 
arrangements in American schooling.89 With the waning of that 
hegemony it has become indisputable. This Part demonstrates this by 
reviewing, in its first Section, the dominant political and policy 
consensus that charter schools are public schools. It shows that this 
identification is not determinative as a First Amendment matter; it is 
both politicized and more contextualized than it might appear. 
Subsequent Sections review three areas of law outside the First 
Amendment that depend on determinations that schools are public or 
private, state actors or not, and that might seem, at first thought, to be 
particularly relevant. In each of the three contexts—the education 
clauses of state constitutions, actions for damages against charter 
schools under § 1983, and the funding of special-needs children enrolled 
in privately managed schools—courts and agencies reach very different 
conclusions. These depend both upon specific features of the schools in 
question and also the purpose and nature of the legal regime for which 
the determination of publicness or privateness is important. 
A.     Blanket Identification of Charters as “Public” Schools 
That charter schools are a species of the genus public is the 
prevailing view in policy, political, and popular circles.90 Uninterrogated 
claims that charter schools are public schools are routine if not 
ubiquitous.91 A pro-charter interest group names itself the “National 
 
 88 Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 814 (2012). 
 89 See supra Part I.A. 
 90 James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 393, 405 
(2008). 
 91 See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND 
FAIRNESS 423 (2008) (charters and magnets are among “public school options”); ARNOLD 
SHOBER, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: OUT OF MANY, ONE? 196 
(2012) (“Charter schools must accept the public accountability of the public school system 
because they are public schools.”); Michael E. Hersher, The Law of Charter Schools, in 
EDUCATION AND THE LAW 547, 547 (Stuart Biegel ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“Charter schools are part 
of the public school system, but they are not the same as regular public schools.”); Martha 
Minow, We’re All for Equality in U.S. School Reforms: But What Does It Mean?, in JUST 
SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF DIFFERENCE 21, 40 (Martha Minow, Richard A. 
Shweder & Hazel Rose Markus eds. 2008) (“Although often exempt from systemwide rules 
governing textbook adoptions and even unionization, charter schools operate as public 
schools.”); Vicki L. Phillips, It’s Time for Public Schools and Public Charters to Work Together, 
EDUC. WK., Jan. 12, 2011, at 29 (presenting the argument of a Gates Foundation official that 
society should attack “one of the most persistent divides in public education and accelerate 
progress for all of our students: public charter schools vs. traditional public schools”). 
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Alliance for Public Charter Schools,” for example.92 The publicness of 
the charter school has become central to the self-understanding of many 
funders, advocates, legislators, politicians, unions, scholars, and 
ordinary folk involved in or supportive of the charter movement. It is 
difficult indeed, for example, to imagine a Department of Education in a 
Democratic administration like Barack Obama’s offering charters the 
full-throated endorsement that it has,93 or that charters could have 
diffused so rapidly across the states, were it not plausible to claim that 
charter schools are public schools. 
This view, however, is not so much a reasoned conclusion as a 
framing of a political issue by victorious charter proponents. 
Analytically, the identification of charters as public is not 
straightforward. “Public school” denotes a bundle of characteristics,94 
and charters clearly share some of them and just as clearly do not share 
others.95 
Rather, legislators, politicians, and industry participants harness 
the term “public school” in service of charters96 for the same reasons 
that charter opponents paint charters as utterly foreign to the institution 
of public schooling.97 It cannot be, for example, that charters divert 
funds from public schools if they themselves are public schools. So the 
latter is asserted, notwithstanding that charters self-evidently do divert 
public education funds, if by “public education” one means only 
traditional, district-run schools.98 Similarly, charter systems must be 
distinct from voucher programs if they are public schools, because 
vouchers involve private schools—although charters, just like voucher 
schools, are privately run schools that receive public funds when and 
only when parents choose to enroll their children in such schools. 
It is not only that “public school” carries strong, positive 
associations in American politics;99 the claim that charters are public 
 
 92 See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, http://www.publiccharters.org 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 93 See Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity: School Choice and 
Racial Integration in the Age of Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 219, 243 (2010). 
 94 See Forman, supra note 72, at 845; Lubienski, Instrumental Perspectives, supra note 83, at 
479–83; Ryan, supra note 90, at 405; Aaron Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support 
“Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 935–37, 939–44 (2007) [hereinafter Saiger, School Choice 
and States’ Duty]. 
 95 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21 (“[A] school 
that chooses to accept vouchers becomes a particular kind of public school, less regulated than 
charter or community schools but still a public school.”). 
 96 See Lubienski, Instrumental Perspectives, supra note 83, at 482 (“[P]erhaps because the 
general population is largely unfamiliar with educational alternatives, but committed to public 
education, many descriptions of such schools emphasize the public aspect in explaining 
reforms to the public.”). 
 97 See supra Part I.B. 
 98 See generally Rich, supra note 63. 
 99 Carper & Hunt, supra note 80, at 87 (“[A] majority of citizens and the politically and 
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inoculates them from charges that they compete with, and in that sense 
threaten, public schools. It frames charters not as an alternative to 
public schools but instead as part of a long tradition of public-school 
reform from within. It is unsurprising, with charters on the rise, that 
this framing is at this moment dominant. But it is hard to regard this as 
shedding much light on whether, as a legal matter, charters are public 
schools. 
One also finds in the legal literature scholars who identify charter 
schools generally as “public” state actors. Robert O’Neil, writing before 
Zelman, says that charter schools constitute an “[e]asy [c]ase” of state 
action.100 For O’Neil, the close regulation of charters settles the question: 
if a charter school were given sufficient regulatory latitude to undermine 
its umbilical connection to state authority, “such an entity would not be 
a charter school as that term is currently understood.”101 This analysis 
perseveres post-Zelman. “Charter schools most likely would be found 
part of the government for constitutional purposes,” writes Gillian 
Metzger, “given that they are officially denominated public schools, 
often are created by the state, and operate subject to the state’s direct 
oversight.”102 Metzger also notes that charters have “extensive 
government involvement”103 and that “managing a public school 
(although not providing educational services) is traditionally the 
exclusive prerogative” of government.104 
But O’Neil, Metzger, and other scholars of privatization who agree 
with them likely intend no implication that their conclusions about state 
action should extend to the First Amendment context. They make no 
argument that state action is not context dependent and advance no 
First Amendment claims. Indeed, O’Neil distinguishes a religious school 
that seeks to “constrain sacrilege or blasphemy on the part of its faculty” 
from one that tries to limit teacher speech on secular subjects or 
discriminate by race in student admissions.105 
B.     State Constitutional Law of Education 
Governors and state legislators feel the imperative to identify 
charter schools as public as keenly as any charter proponent. This is 
 
culturally powerful still revere public education.”). 
 100 Robert M. O’Neil, School Choice and State Action, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 215, 220 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. 
Kemerer eds. 1999). 
 101 Id. at 221. 
 102 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1495 (2003). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1495–96. 
 105 O’Neil, supra note 100, at 225. 
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evident from a review of state charter-school statutes. Even as these 
statutes establish rights, duties, and organizational structures that 
differentiate charters from public schools as traditionally organized, 
nearly every one explicitly provides that charter schools are, by 
definition, public schools.106 
These statutory definitions, along with whatever political benefits 
they bring, also address a particular legal imperative. Most state 
constitutions, many drafted and ratified under the influence of 
Progressive educational thinking, use the Progressive language of 
“public” or “common schools” in establishing the state duty to establish 
schools and students’ rights to attend them.107 States discharge those 
duties and/or fulfill resident children’s rights by funding charters, on 
standard readings of these clauses, only if those charters are “common” 
or “public.” In a handful of states, this has led to litigation regarding 
what constitutes a “public” school. 
In Ohio, a facial challenge under that state’s constitution alleged 
that the state’s constitutional duty to support a “thorough and efficient 
system of common schools”108 prohibited charter schools from receiving 
state monies because charters are not “common.”109 The Ohio Supreme 
Court rejected this argument.110 It held that the regulatory regime 
governing charter school operations was sufficiently governmental, and 
 
 106 See ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.255(a) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-181(A) (2012); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 6-23-102 (2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601(e) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 22-30.5-104(2)(b), 22-30.5-104(4.5)(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66aa(1) (2012); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 501 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(1) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2062(3) 
(2012); 2012 Haw. Sess. Laws act 130 pt. I, § 1 (S.B. 2115 at 3, 4); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5202 
(2012); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(3) (West 2012); IND. CODE § 20-24-1-4 (2012); 
IOWA CODE § 256F.4(2)(b) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1903(a) (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 17:3973(2)(a) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-101(b) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89(c) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.501(1) (West 2012); 
MINN. STAT. § 124D.10(b)(2) subdiv. 7 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.400(1) (2012); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 18A:36A-3(a) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-2(A) (2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 2853(1)(c) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29E(a) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3314.01(B) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-132(C) (2012); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 338.015 (2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1703-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 16-77-3.1(a) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-40(2)(a) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-13-105(a) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-503.5(1) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 22.1-212.5(B) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3-303(c), 21-3-304(a) (2012); Sugarman & 
Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 873. But cf. Maren Hulden, Note, Charting a Course to State 
Action: Charter Schools and § 1983, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1255 & n.44 (2011) (stating only 
that a “majority” of states define charters as public schools and defining axes along which state 
statutory regimes differ). 
 107 See Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty, supra note 94, at 926–27. 
 108 OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 109 State ex rel Ohio Cong. of Parents v. State Bd. of Educ., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶¶ 23–26, 857 
N.E.2d 1148, 1156–57. 
 110 Id. ¶¶ 27–34, 857 N.E.2d at 1157–59. 
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sufficiently similar to the regime applicable to traditional public schools, 
to render charter schools public schools.111 
The Georgia Supreme Court faced both a somewhat different issue 
and an idiosyncratic constitutional text in 2011.112 It held that its 
legislature could not itself charter schools pursuant to its constitutional 
authority to “provide by law for the creation of special schools in such 
areas as may require them.”113 The court understood the legislature’s 
authority to create “special” schools as an exception to the Georgia 
constitution’s general grant of authority “to county and area boards of 
education to establish and maintain public schools within their 
limits.”114 But charters, the court held, are not “special”: they 
“necessarily operate in competition with or duplicate the efforts of 
locally controlled general K–12 schools by enrolling the same types of 
K–12 students who attend locally controlled schools and by teaching 
them the same subjects that may be taught at locally controlled 
schools.”115 The Georgia court explicitly determined that differences 
between charter schools’ and traditional schools’ pedagogy, 
organization, funding, and susceptibility to the market did not make 
charters “special.”116 The court therefore concluded that charters are 
constitutional only if “county and area boards of education . . . establish 
and maintain” them as “public schools.”117 
Whereas the Ohio case expands the scope of chartering, the 
Georgia case was a blow to charter proponents, who want to be able to 
call charters public but want even more to be able successfully to secure 
charters. This is difficult when chartering authority rests exclusively 
with the traditional school districts with which charters compete. But 
both cases emphatically endorse the view that charter schools are public 
schools. Moreover, both courts make the same move to reach this 
conclusion: they conclude that their states’ charter schools are 
sufficiently similar to traditional public schools because the regulatory 
regimes that govern them are sufficiently similar. “[W]hile it is true that 
community schools are exempted from certain state standards,” writes 
the Ohio court, “there are others to which the schools must also 
adhere.”118 The court multiplies examples at length.119 The Georgia 
court goes even further. It declares that charter and traditional public 
 
 111 Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 857 N.E.2d at 1159. 
 112 Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 710 S.E.2d 773, 782 (Ga. 2011) (relevant Georgia 
constitutional language is “unique”). 
 113 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 7(a). 
 114 Id. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 1. 
 115 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 777. 
 116 Id. at 780–81. 
 117 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 1. 
 118 State ex rel Ohio Cong. of Parents v. State Bd. of Educ., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 30, 857 N.E.2d 
1148, 1157–58. 
 119 Id. ¶¶ 110–75, 857 N.E.2d at 1171–74. 
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school teachers alike “teach [their] students in accordance with the same 
statutory standards of professional performance that govern the conduct 
of all of the State’s educators.”120 Moreover, “every general K–12 public 
school has a ‘unique operating charter’—whether memorialized in 
writing or merely implicit in the unique nature of each school’s faculty, 
administration and student body.”121 Charters and publics are really the 
same. 
In setting out the facts of the cases, both courts note that their 
respective legislatures declared charter schools to be public schools.122 
Neither seems inclined to question this assertion. This is not because 
these courts are prepared to derogate their authority in this area to 
lawmakers. Quite the contrary: the cases reject emphatically the 
formalist position that charter schools are “public” because state 
legislatures declare them to be so.123 When a dissenter suggested that the 
Ohio opinion “treats the mandate for a system of common schools as 
standardless, denoting any schooling arrangement that the General 
Assembly decides to support by general taxation,”124 the majority 
emphatically retorts: “[W]e do not approve of just ‘any schooling 
arrangement.’”125 The Georgia court takes the maximalist position that 
only the judiciary may construe “a constitutional phrase”126 like “special 
school,”127 and that the legislature has “no power” to do so.128 “Public 
schools” is also a constitutional phrase in Georgia.129 So it is not based 
upon the public school code that these courts know what a 
constitutional public school is; rather, these courts agree with the 
legislators that charters fit within the meaning of the constitutional 
phrase “public school.” 
But the court’s functionalism is only surface-deep. The courts 
review at great length the similarities between the regulatory regimes 
governing traditional public schools and charter schools; but they never 
explain why the nature of the regulatory regime is what matters in 
interpreting the constitutional text. Charters and traditional publics are 
also similar in having many rooms, and school bells, and blackboards; 
 
 120 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 780 (internal citation omitted). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Ohio Cong., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 5, 857 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing 147 Ohio Laws pt. I, 909, 
1187); Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 776 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2081(2)). 
 123 Accord Frank R. Kemerer & Catherine Maloney, The Legal Framework for Educational 
Privatization and Accountability, 150 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 589, 597–98 (2001). 
 124 Ohio Cong., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 82, 857 N.E.2d at 1167 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
 125 Id. at ¶ 32, 857 N.E.2d at 1159 (majority opinion) (citing id. ¶ 82, 857 N.E.2d at 1167 
(Resnick, J., dissenting)). 
 126 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 780. 
 127 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 7(a). 
 128 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 780. 
 129 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 1 (“Authority is granted to county and area boards of 
education to establish and maintain public schools within their limits . . . .”); see also Gwinnett 
Cnty, 710 S.E.2d at 775–76 (discussing history of Georgia education clauses). 
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why is the shape of the regulatory regime not like these obviously 
unimportant features? This question can be answered, but the courts do 
not even attempt to respond to it. For all the space the opinions give to 
similarities between charters and public schools, they say nothing about 
how they determine which features of a school makes it public. Here is 
the peroration of the Ohio court’s opinion: “To achieve the goal of 
improving and customizing public education programs, the General 
Assembly has augmented the state’s public school system with public 
community schools” (“community schools” being Ohio’s term for 
charters).130 Similarly, neither the Ohio nor the Georgia cases mention 
private schools, apparently thinking them irrelevant. But they are very 
relevant: if the critical legal fact is that charters and traditional public 
schools are regulated similarly, then it is worth noting, at least, that 
private schools are also regulated by the states, in many respects 
similarly to the ways public schools are regulated. The Ohio and 
Georgia courts ignore this. 
Ultimately, the Georgia and Ohio supreme courts do not address 
this question because for them it goes without saying. They know what a 
public school is when they see it—and what they see is what everyone 
means by “public school,” i.e., a Progressive school. This approach has 
an originalist cast, in that the framers of twentieth-century education 
clauses arguably constitutionalized Progressivism when they used the 
terms “public” or “common school,” terms of art to Progressives. But at 
base it is an ordinary-meaning claim: we still understand the terms as 
the Progressives did and do, because that is the kind of public school 
system that we have. 
These cases therefore shed little light on the public/private question 
in federal constitutional law. Not only does the education-clause context 
place them in a state-law context without a federal analogue,131 but the 
interpretative roadmap that state courts offer in this area fails to engage 
the issue at the heart of the federal question. 
C.     Section 1983 Actions 
Whether a particular school is public is sometimes relevant to tort 
liability. Libel is one example. The federal district court in the district of 
Minnesota barred a counterclaim alleging libel brought by a charter 
school because libel claims cannot be raised by “public” entities.132 The 
case, without much analysis, held that the charter school was a public 
 
 130 Ohio Cong., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 32, 857 N.E.2d at 1158–59. 
 131 See Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty, supra note 94, at 925. 
 132 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Minn. v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Acad., No. 09-138(DWF/JJG), 
2009 WL 4823378, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2009). 
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school largely because state law said it was a public school, and because 
it “incorporated itself as such in order to be approved as a public charter 
school under” the state chartering statute.133 This language, and 
language in similar cases, suggests that some courts understand 
publicness as a question of state law, rather than one of federal law or of 
fact; and moreover that they view state declarations that charters are 
public as determinative of the state-law question.134 Other cases simply 
assume that charters are public schools, perhaps because the parties 
failed to raise the issue and perhaps because courts found it obvious.135 
The Supreme Court addressed this question explicitly in the 
important case of Rendell-Baker v. Kahn, decided in 1982. Rendell-Baker 
involved a school organized, administered, and managed as a private 
corporation to provide special education services and to serve youth 
under the supervision of the criminal justice system.136 The Court held 
that such a school did not act “under color of state law” for the purpose 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.137 The Court reached this conclusion 
notwithstanding that the school received between 90% and 99% of its 
annual income from public authorities.138 The Court categorically 
rejected Justice Marshall’s suggestion that “[t]he fact that the school is 
providing a substitute for public education is also an important 
indicium of state action.”139 Instead the Court viewed the private school 
as a government contractor.140 It enjoyed freedom of action141 except to 
the extent it chose to limit that freedom by contract. Its private nature 
was confirmed precisely by its contractual relationship with a public 
authority.142 It is also worth noting that Justice Marshall himself, while 
arguing that the school acted under color of state law, appeared to 
harbor no doubts that it was a “private enterprise,” a “substitute for,” 
rather than example of, public education.143 
Kimberly Yuracko relies in part on Rendell-Baker to argue that 
homeschoolers are state actors, either under a “public function” theory 
that attributes state action to “private actors [who] exercise 
monopolistic control over a traditionally public function,”144 or a 
 
 133 Id. 
 134 Cf. Hulden, supra note 106, at 1268–70 (collecting cases). 
 135 E.g., Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 298–300 (D.N.J. 1998); see also Hulden, supra 
note 106, at 1268–69. 
 136 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832–33 (1982). 
 137 Id. at 843. 
 138 Id. at 832–33 & n.1. 
 139 Id. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 140 Id. at 843 (majority opinion). 
 141 Id. at 841. 
 142 Id. at 840–43. 
 143 Id. at 847–48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 144 See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on 
Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 142–43 (2008). 
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“delegation” theory which prevents governments from ducking 
constitutional duties by “delegating . . . public functions to private 
actors.”145 But Rendell-Baker explicitly rejects such an argument with 
respect to institutional, private schools. Private schooling predates 
public schooling, and even in the heyday of Progressivism a robust 
private school sector functioned in parallel with public schools.146 
Because education is not “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the 
state,”147 private schools, even when their resources come nearly entirely 
from public funds, do not provide a “public function” and thus become 
public state actors.148 The Ninth Circuit so reasoned when it determined 
that charter schools were not necessarily state actors for employment 
purposes.149 The court stressed that “[u]nder § 1983, a state’s statutory 
characterization of a private entity as a public actor for some purposes is 
not necessarily dispositive with respect to all of that entity’s conduct.”150 
It also, moreover, concluded that state law’s contrary characterization of 
charter schools as “public” was not “controlling.”151 
D.     Educating Children with Disabilities 
Rendell-Baker is an interesting case because special education was, 
until the advent of charter and voucher programs, the primary arena in 
which the publicness and privateness of schools was an important 
federal regulatory question. Rendell-Baker itself involved a state-law 
program by which Massachusetts officials placed certain children in 
private schools at state expense to provide them with “necessary special 
education” services. This program is the Massachusetts counterpart to 
the federal scheme enshrined in the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).152 The IDEA guarantees to all disabled children 
(who live in states that choose to receive the associated federal funds) a 
right to a “free, appropriate public education” (FAPE).153 FAPE, the core 
substantive right of the IDEA, is important to the state action question 
because it requires that disabled children be provided with education 
that is not only “free” but “public.” 
 
 145 Id. at 146, 149. 
 146 Id. at 145. 
 147 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. 
 148 But cf. Yuracko, supra note 144, at 146 (“Homeschooling parents” perform a “public 
function” because they “exercise exclusive control over education . . . with respect to their own 
children.”). 
 149 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 150 Id. at 814. 
 151 Id. at 813–14, 816. 
 152 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006). 
 153 Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
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Nevertheless, the policy described in Rendell-Baker—placing 
special education students in private facilities at public expense—has 
been legislatively and judicially understood as a way to fulfill the FAPE 
requirement since the passage of the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act, the predecessor of the IDEA. The statute, even as it 
promulgated the FAPE requirement and its associated definitions 
(which remain in force),154 anticipated that states would “plac[e] or 
refe[r]” handicapped children in “private schools and facilities . . . as the 
means of carrying out [its] requirements.”155 The recent 1997 
amendments to the IDEA even more explicitly contemplate that private 
placement is a permissible “means for carrying out the 
requirements . . . requiring the provision of special education and 
related services to all children with disabilities,”156 which is the core 
FAPE obligation. Public systems that fail to provide FAPE in their own 
institutions can also be compelled by parents, both retrospectively and 
prospectively, to pay tuition for appropriate private education in lieu of 
public services.157 
This last guarantee was established and then expanded in a line of 
Supreme Court cases that permitted parents to be reimbursed for 
unilaterally placing their children in private schools if they could 
subsequently demonstrate that the public schools would not have 
provided FAPE.158 On the face of the statute this is remarkable: state 
failure to provide appropriate public education triggers an obligation to 
provide private education. The most recent of these cases, which 
broadened the scope of retroactive reimbursement for private school 
tuitions to include parents whose children were never enrolled in a 
public school, is particularly striking when it insists that without such 
reimbursement, a “child’s right to a free appropriate 
education . . . would be less than complete.”159 This statement casually 
elides the statute’s requirement that appropriate education also be 
“public,” and its purported direct quotation of its own earlier precedent 
simply omits the word “public” without even ellipsis.160 
What emerges from the statute, regulations, and case law is a 
requirement to provide “public” education to disabled children that can 
be and is routinely met by placement in “private” schools. Those private 
schools do not thus become “public,” as Rendell-Baker attests; the IDEA 
also calls them “private.” The requirement that the education provided 
 
 154 Id. §§ 1401(16), 1401(18), 1412(1) (1976). 
 155 Id. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1976); accord S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 50 (1975). 
 156 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (2006). 
 157 Id. § 1412(a)(10)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.325 (2012). 
 158 See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t 
of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 159 See Forest Grove, 557 U.S at 244–45 (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369). 
 160 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. 
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in those private schools be “public” is met, in the view of the Congress 
and of the Court, primarily by ensuring that the costs of the private 
education be paid for with public funds. 
Standard principles of statutory interpretation urge that the phrase 
“free, appropriate public education” be read to mean that “public” 
education must be something beyond “free.”161 This is buttressed by the 
Act’s definition of FAPE as “special education and related services 
that . . . have been provided” not only “at public expense . . . and without 
charge” but also “under public supervision and direction.”162 Further 
reinforcing the notion that “public” should mean something beyond “at 
no cost to parents” is the Act’s definition of “special education” as 
“specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents.”163 But Congress 
did not intend, and neither Congress nor the courts have read, either 
“public . . . education” nor “public supervision and direction” to mean 
that public schools should provide the necessary services. All that is 
required is that public authorities, if they choose to direct public funds 
to private institutions, satisfy themselves that those private entities will 
provide the appropriate services.164 Special education is therefore 
“public” if it is paid for by the public and if there is some level of public 
regulation, whether by rule or by contract, ensuring that the state gets 
what it pays for. It is a sort of “public” education that is routinely 
delivered in “private” schools. 
III.     RELIGIOUS CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT 
PRINCIPLES 
Rather than asking whether charter schools are public schools in 
the abstract, one should ask whether they are public schools or private 
schools for the purpose of the relevant First Amendment rule that 
 
 161 Against this presumption is the Progressive practice of using the adjectives “free” and 
“public,” along with other terms such as “thorough,” “general,” “‘uniform,” and “efficient,” as 
synonyms for the Progressive, “common” school. See Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty, 
supra note 94, at 926. Many state constitutions deploy these adjectives in groups and it is not 
clear that each is intended, or otherwise should, bear independent meaning. Id. at 925–26. But 
while such a reading of the IDEA would permit the “free” and “public” components of FAPE to 
bear overlapping meanings, those meanings would take on a Progressive cast inimical to the 
practice of private special-education placements. 
 162 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A). 
 163 Id. § 1401(29). 
 164 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. Prior to the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, the courts 
suggested that the requirement that private entities provide “appropriate” services was based 
not on the FAPE provision that education be “appropriate” as well as “free” and “public” but on 
the legislative direction that, when FAPE was not provided, parents should be “grant[ed] such 
relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1975) (emphasis added); 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. The 1997 amendments make it clearer that only a private placement 
that provides appropriate education fulfills FAPE rights. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(ii). 
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private schools may engage in religious activities but public schools may 
not. The answer to such a question must be found in the Supreme Court 
cases that announce that public schools must be secular and in the 
policies that underlie those cases. This Part analyzes these sources and 
concludes that, for First Amendment purposes, charter schools are 
private schools, and can therefore engage in religious activities much as 
other private schools do. 
The Part proceeds in the following way. Its first Section analyzes 
Establishment Clause case law, emphasizing Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,165 to conclude that charters are First Amendment private schools 
that may engage in religious activity. Its second Section concludes that 
the current structure of charter school funding, in which states subsidize 
charters based upon their enrollment, is no obstacle to such activity. 
This is so notwithstanding the problematic case of Mitchell v. Helms.166 
A final Section develops an important caveat to this conclusion: states 
are obligated to guarantee a free, secular education to all children who 
want one, even if demand for secular schooling is insufficient to 
generate the necessary seats in an unregulated market. 
A.     Charter Schools Are Private Schools for First Amendment Purposes 
The previous Part suggests that no single definition of “public 
school” directly applies to the hybrid form of the charter. Instead, the 
meaning of “public school” for religion clause purposes depends upon 
“the particular . . . context of public elementary and secondary 
schools”167 and of the clauses. Schools are not public or private, for 
religion-clause purposes, because they are so labeled by legislatures or 
others;168 federal constitutional criteria control the determination. The 
cases demonstrate that in the First Amendment context, a school is a 
public state actor if its services are publicly provided, in the sense that 
their instructional and policymaking staff are not only remunerated by 
the government but subject to its direct-line authority.169 They must be 
government agents, not just contractors. In light of these cases, 
especially Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,170 I conclude that, for religion-
clause purposes, charter schools are private schools and not state actors. 
 
 165 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 166 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 167 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987). 
 168 See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
 169 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226, 230 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)). The Agostini opinion is 
quoted in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809. 
  170 536 U.S. 639. 
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The foundational case of Engel v. Vitale, holding that “it is no part 
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group 
of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried 
on by government,”171 says nothing about what makes a public school 
public. Neither does Abington School District v. Schempp, which a year 
later prohibited public schools from beginning the school day with Bible 
readings.172 These and successor cases proceed without even a gesture 
towards defining the key term “public school” because the Abington 
Senior High School, like the Union Free School District No. 9 (in Engel), 
the Nathan Bishop Middle School (in Lee v. Weisman),173 and the 
legions of other public schools that populate the Court’s cases each was 
obviously, quintessentially, a public school. Everyone understood what a 
public school was; there was no potential for confusion.  
These cases nevertheless make clear, to use the language of Engel, 
that the First Amendment is violated when government officials do the 
“compos[ing]” and the “carr[ying] on.”174 Similarly, Abington School 
District emphasized that the Bible readings were unconstitutional 
because they were “held in the school buildings under the supervision 
and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools.”175 
Later cases make the same point, that religious activity in public schools 
is forbidden because “[s]tate officials direct” that activity.176 The core 
problem identified by the case law is government employees and/or 
government facilities directing religious instruction or practice. 
This proposition becomes explicit in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
which upheld a program in which the state of Ohio offered vouchers to 
Cleveland parents that could be redeemed at participating private 
schools.177 Schools’ variable willingness to participate and parents’ 
choices combined to lead nearly all vouchers to be cashed at religious 
schools.178 The Supreme Court found that the program was nevertheless 
constitutional because it was “neutral in all respects toward religion.”179 
Government aid reached religious schools only as a result of the 
“genuine and independent choices of private individuals.”180 
Zelman is notable as the only Supreme Court opinion that 
explicitly considers the quasi-market that results from parents’ ability to 
select among three kinds of schools: traditional public schools, 
 
 171 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962). 
 172 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
 173 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992). 
 174 Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. 
 175 Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 223. 
 176 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577. 
 177 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 178 Id. at 647. 
 179 Id. at 653. 
 180 Id. at 649. 
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traditional private schools, and charter schools. (As noted, Ohio calls its 
charters “community schools.”) The Justices’ several opinions debate at 
length whether and how the presence of the community schools on the 
menu available to Cleveland parents should affect the outcome of the 
case. For the Zelman majority, Ohio invited parents to exercise choice 
across both “community school” and voucher options in addition to 
traditional public schools.181 Charter schools and the voucher program 
were together part of “a broader undertaking by the State to enhance the 
educational options of Cleveland’s schoolchildren” through choice.182 
The presence of the community schools, all secular, in the mix was 
evidence that the voucher program did not “skew” parents’ choices 
towards religious options.183 The dissenters, by contrast, viewed the 
question of whether the voucher program presented parents with a 
“genuine and independent”184 choice between religion and irreligion 
only in terms of whether the set of participating private schools included 
both religious and secular institutions.185 
The Court’s opinion in Zelman, apparently purposefully, 
repeatedly avoids stating whether the community schools are “public” 
or “private.” In introducing them, it says merely that they “are funded 
under state law but are run by their own school boards, not by local 
school districts.”186 The opinion goes on (accurately) to note that the 
schools at issue in the case exist along a spectrum that ranges from 
public to private: “Parents that choose to participate in the scholarship 
program and then to enroll their children in a private school (religious 
or nonreligious) must copay a portion of the school’s tuition. Families 
that choose a community school, magnet school, or traditional public 
school pay nothing.”187 No label is attached to the charters. 
The separate opinions in the case are more willing to categorize 
charters in order to advance their arguments. Justice Thomas calls 
Ohio’s charters “privately run community schools.”188 Justice Souter, 
writing for four dissenters, calls them “community public schools.”189 
But Souter expresses some doubt about his conclusion: “To be fair, 
community schools do exhibit some features of private schools: they are 
autonomously managed without any interference from the school 
district or State.”190 “[I]n substance,” he writes, community schools are 
 
 181 Id. at 659. 
 182 Id. at 647. 
 183 Id. at 653–54 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487–
88 (1986)). 
 184 Id. at 649. 
 185 Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 186 Id. at 647 (majority opinion). 
 187 Id. at 654. 
 188 Id. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 189 Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 190 Id. at 701 n.9. 
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“merely private schools with state funding.”191 Souter’s objection to the 
majority’s reasoning (in this section of his lengthy dissent) is not so 
much that it miscategorizes community schools as that its reasoning 
about the range of choice includes “any public school” that is 
“nontraditional.”192 
Souter’s admission that charters are “in substance merely private 
schools” is telling.193 Indeed, the standard charter regime—in which 
parents may opt to send their children to a particular charter, in which 
case a public subsidy is directed or redirected to that school—is 
isomorphic with the voucher program the Court blesses in Zelman. 
Private parties manage and make decisions for both charter schools and 
voucher-receiving schools. In both cases, schools’ eligibility to receive a 
per-student subsidy depends both upon their compliance with 
government requirements and parental decisions: only if they can get 
families to enroll their children do they receive funds. Also, in neither 
case do parents receive cash. The actual transfer of funds, triggered by 
parental choice, is direct from government to school. 
Charter schools and Zelman’s voucher schools do differ, but not in 
ways significant for First Amendment purposes. It obviously does not 
matter, for example, that schools must apply for charters while private 
schools can cash vouchers if they meet eligibility requirements and then 
elect to participate. Nor, I argue, do two more significant differences—
the scope of public regulatory control and the charging of tuition—
provide a basis for distinction. 
Charters are often claimed to be more similar to public than to 
private schools because charters are very heavily regulated. In addition 
to requirements regarding collective bargaining (in some states) and 
admissions (in all), states often require charters to cover a set 
curriculum, to provide special education, and to keep various kinds of 
records.194 Charters are subject to requirements, sometimes strenuous, 
governing reporting of academic and other data and to assessment and 
re-assessment by their chartering authority.195 Such heavy regulation, as 
noted above, was pivotal to the determination by some state courts that 
charter schools are public schools.196 
This position is ironic for two reasons. First, the sine qua non of 
the charter system is that charters can “operate with much less oversight 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. Although Justice Stevens joined Souter’s dissent, Stevens’s own separate opinion, 
joined by none of his colleagues, insists that community schools are a species of public schools. 
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 193 Id. at 701 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 194 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 195 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 920. 
 196 See supra Part II.A. 
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and regulation than traditional public schools.”197 The whole concept is 
that market accountability substitutes for close regulation.198 Second, 
traditional private schools are also subject to substantial regulation.199 
Many states impose obligations upon them with respect to curriculum, 
testing, record-keeping, and teacher qualifications. True, the state 
cannot restrict, except in particular ways, the choices they make about 
supplementing that curriculum, but neither do states restrict charters in 
this way. Private school teachers can be subject to state requirements for 
accreditation and to state labor law (although, the Supreme Court 
recently affirmed, the latter is subject to a “ministerial exception”).200 
Indeed, in Zelman itself, the religious private schools participating in the 
voucher program were subjected not only to the regulatory regime 
governing all private schools,201 but also to additional requirements 
regarding nondiscrimination,202 size,203 curriculum,204 and 
transparency.205 These similarities were brought to the Court’s attention.  
There are areas with respect to which the regulatory regimes 
governing private schools and charters differ. Charters, but not private 
schools, must admit all applicants or use a lottery should the number of 
applications exceed the number of places.206 Nor must private schools 
reach target levels of academic achievement,207 or submit to regular 
inspections from state officials, as charters are often required to do.208 
But each of these is an obligation detailed in the school’s charter, which 
is no more than a contract between the chartering authority and the 
school.209 That chartering authorities seek a particular set of contract 
terms does not change the character of the charter as a public/private 
agreement. Moreover, private schools do face some analogous 
requirements. Floors for academic achievement and periodic 
monitoring are features of private-school accreditation.210 With respect 
to student admissions, the voucher schools of Zelman were also 
 
 197 Amy Stuart Wells et al., Charter Schools as Postmodern Paradox: Rethinking Social 
Stratification in an Age of Deregulated School Choice, 69 HARV. EDUC. REV. 172, 174 (1999). 
 198 See id. 
 199 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 179. 
 200 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707–08 
(2012). 
 201 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(3) (West 2012). 
 202 Id. § 3313.976(A)(4). 
 203 Id. § 3313.976(A)(5). 
 204 Id. § 3313.976(A)(6). 
 205 Id. § 3313.976(A)(7). 
 206 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 207 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 901–02, 919, 921. 
 208 See id. at 920. 
 209 See FINN, MANNO & VANOUREK, supra note 52, at 15. 
 210 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 878. 
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subjected to a regime of open admissions and lotteries for 
oversubscribed seats, but did not become public thereby.211 
The differences between charter and private school regulation, in 
short, are differences only of degree, and not in kind. Professor O’Neil 
imagines that a charter school insufficiently coupled to public authority 
by regulation would not be a charter school: “It might well partake some 
of the qualities of a charter school but would be in fact (whatever the 
terminology) a state-licensed, state-regulated, and possibly state-funded 
private school.”212 I cannot discern where on the spectrum of regulation, 
from private schools to private schools receiving vouchers to charters to 
traditional publics, O’Neil’s red line is to be drawn. 
Charters also differ from private schools, and are similar to 
traditional public schools, because they charge no tuition.213 Private 
schools, on the other hand, charge some or all of their students. The 
Zelman voucher required a parental copayment to the school.214 But the 
Supreme Court, in its tax-credit cases,215 its special education cases,216 
and especially in Zelman, has made it abundantly clear that private 
schools that accept state vouchers remain private schools. This is true 
even if the private schools use the vouchers as their primary source of 
support for the voucher-bearing student’s education, imposing only 
minimal additional private charges on the family.217 Moreover, charter 
schools also have access to some kinds of private monies, such as 
philanthropy, grants, and, in the case of for-profit charters, investment 
capital.218 The income stream enjoyed by a regulated and subsidized 
private school again differs only in degree, not in kind, from that 
enjoyed by a charter school. 
Private management, however, does constitute a difference in kind. 
As James Ryan has argued, “it must be the combination of government 
funding and government oversight that makes a school public.”219 And 
if, as I have argued, even close regulation is insufficient to constitute the 
necessary kind of oversight, then it must be public control, not public 
subsidy, that defines “public” in contradistinction to private schools. 
 
 211 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.977(A)(1)(d) (West 2012) (providing for admission to 
voucher-accepting schools “from among such applicants by lot,” subject only to preferences for 
previously enrolled students, siblings of previously enrolled students, and students of low 
income). 
 212 O’Neil, supra note 100, at 221. 
 213 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 873. 
 214 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002). 
 215 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 216 See supra Part II.D. 
 217 Ohio limited the copayment that Cleveland private schools could impose upon voucher 
families. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646. 
 218 See, e.g., Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(noting this fact in the context of a § 1983 analysis). 
 219 Ryan, supra note 90, at 407–08. 
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Public control means line control, where every policy action by the 
school is ultimately subject, through bureaucratic hierarchy, to local 
voters. In this sense, charter schools decisions are clearly not public. To 
be sure, the scope of their potential decisions is limited by the state, but 
in exactly the same sense as any private actor in a regulated industry 
contracting with the government has its discretion limited. A charter 
must abide by relevant regulation, and may choose to accept above 
those requirements the terms of any government contract, but within 
the envelope established by these the charter is free to act as it will. 
This reading offers a significant rehabilitation of Zelman. Where 
most authors in the aftermath of Zelman dismiss it on the grounds of 
vouchers’ negligible political purchase,220 Zelman’s reach extends to the 
galloping proliferation of charter schools. It stands for the proposition 
that the bulk of Supreme Court jurisprudence about religion and public 
schools does not apply to neoliberal educational regimes. Charter 
schools are so similar to the voucher-accepting schools of Zelman that it 
is difficult to posit any plausible argument asserting that they are, as 
schools, different. Therefore, just as the private schools in Zelman could 
teach and practice religion, even while supported by publicly funded 
vouchers, because that funding was provided them only to the extent 
that they were freely chosen by parents—so too charters embedded in 
such a program of parental choice can freely teach and practice religion. 
B.     Charter Funding Is No Obstacle to Charters’ Religious Activities in a 
Neoliberal Framework 
Prior to Zelman, a case concerning loans by the State of Louisiana 
to parochial schools of “instructional and educational materials” badly 
fractured the Supreme Court.221 The controlling separate opinion in the 
case,222 written by Justice O’Connor and joined by Justice Breyer, 
distinguished “direct” and “indirect” government aid to religious 
schools. O’Connor and Breyer agreed with four other Justices that 
“indirect” aid, mediated by private choice like scholarship223 or 
voucher224 programs, is constitutional if the program is neutral with 
respect to religion.225 But, O’Connor wrote in Mitchell v. Helms, direct 
 
 220 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 221 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting 20 
U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2) (2000)). 
 222 For the controlling nature of O’Connor’s opinion, see Steven K. Green, The 
Constitutionality of Vouchers After Mitchell v. Helms, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 57, 63 
(2000) [hereinafter Green, The Constitutionality of Vouchers]; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 75 (2005). 
 223 See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
 224 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 225 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 7–8. 
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aid requires additional guarantees that it not be used for or diverted to 
religious purposes.226 Zelman, moreover, preserved the direct/indirect 
distinction.227 
State aid to charter schools does appear to be “direct” aid as 
O’Connor understands it. At one time the Supreme Court used the term 
“direct aid” to encompass not only any “cash paymen[t]” but any 
“substantial” subsidy to a religious school.228 “Indirect aid” meant only 
those subsidies that met the Lemon-era requirement that they not have 
the “primary effect” of advancing religion.229 But O’Connor, who 
approves of indirect cash payments, repurposes the term “direct” to 
mean state payments made to religious schools without the mediation of 
a private party, such as a student or a family.230 Indirect payments (not 
necessarily cash) must be placed in the hands of a private person who 
then redirects it to the school.231 O’Connor is explicit that payments 
remain direct if they are per-capita aid based upon enrollment, even if 
enrollment is a private choice, so long as payment flows directly from 
state to school.232 This is precisely the structure of state aid to charter 
schools. 
Nonetheless, for several reasons Justice O’Connor’s Mitchell 
opinion should not be understood to prevent charter schools from 
simultaneously engaging in religious activity and receiving state aid. 
First, its distinction between direct and indirect aid is extraordinarily 
formalist, verging on the incoherent.233 A scheme under which aid flows 
“directly” to a school on a per-capita basis, but where the number of 
heads for which aid is provided is entirely dependent on students’ “free 
and independent” enrollment decisions, is in no meaningful way 
different from indirect aid.234 In both, private choices are the sole 
determinant of whether and how much public monies schools receive.235 
 
 226 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 222, at 75. 
 227 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649 (“[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent distinction 
between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and programs of 
true private choice . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 228 Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393–94 (1985); see also Steven K. Green, 
Private School Vouchers and the Confusion over “Direct” Aid, 10 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 47, 
74–75 (1999–2000). 
 229 See Ball, 473 U.S. at 393. 
 230 Cf. Green, The Constitutionality of Vouchers, supra note 222, at 71 (stating that it is 
“unclear” whether Justice O’Connor rejects the usages in Ball in favor of pure formalism). 
 231 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841–42 (2000) (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in judgment); 
Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the Expression of 
Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1867–68 (2001). 
 232 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in judgment). 
 233 See Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and School 
Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1052–53 (2002). 
 234 See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 
512 n.76 (2002) (“[This] distinction strikes me as amounting to form over substance.”). 
 235 See Frank, supra note 233, at 1053–54. 
SAIGER.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013  12:06 PM 
1198 C A R D O ZO  L AW  R E V I E W  [Vol. 34:1163 
It is not as if the vouchers in Zelman or the scholarship in Witters 
involved actual cash given to private parties, who then elected whether 
to send it on to the school in which they enrolled; the programs 
involved paperwork, not tender. This makes it quite difficult to 
understand O’Connor’s claim that “when the government provides aid 
directly to the student beneficiary, that student can attend a religious 
school and yet retain control over whether the secular government aid 
will be applied toward the religious education.”236 A parent who enrolls 
a student in a charter school, and by doing so directs one unit of state 
per capita aid to that school, is isomorphic to a parent who endorses a 
voucher chit over to a private school, which school on that basis then 
receives a state check. 
Such empty formalism is good reason to ignore O’Connor’s 
direct/indirect distinction, particularly after Zelman. That same 
emptiness, in any event, offers states straightforward work-arounds. 
States could easily add to forms parents use to enroll their children in 
charter schools a statement to the effect, “With this election I direct the 
$x in state aid to which my child is entitled to the charter I have selected 
above.” This change in wording would transform charter funding into 
the sort of “indirect” program that Mitchell does not bar, and which five 
Justices (including O’Connor) blessed in Zelman. If formalism is to 
carry the day, it can be accommodated easily. 
O’Connor’s strongest argument in favor of formalism is that direct 
aid sends a stronger “message of [religious] endorsement” than indirect 
aid.237 A virtue of indirect, mediated aid, she suggests, is that reasonable 
observers will understand its use for religious purposes to result from 
private rather than public decision. This will not be as clear in the case 
of direct, per-capita aid.238 And endorsement has been a dominant 
concern regarding religion and schools since Engel v. Vitale, the 
foundational case that outlawed prayer in public schools.239 Engel makes 
resounding pronouncements that a prayer conducted by a “civil 
magistrate”240 pursuant to “officia[l] prescri[ption]”241 is an illegitimate 
“union of government and religion.”242 
But consider a charter school whose principal decided to begin the 
day with a prayer, whether “nondenominational” like the one in Engel 
or unapologetically sectarian. That prayer is not “official” in the way 
that its counterpart was in Engel. Its text would be set not by a “civil 
 
 236 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in judgment). 
 237 Id. at 842–43. 
 238 See Garnett, supra note 231, at 1869; Steven G. Gey, Reconciling The Supreme Court’s 
Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 752 (2006). 
 239 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 240 Id. at 432. 
 241 Id. at 433. 
 242 Id. at 431. 
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magistrate”243 but by a private party, avoiding government involvement 
in the “compos[ition] [of] official prayers.”244 The setting and timing of 
the prayers would similarly not be determined by government. The 
prayers moreover would be heard only by students whose families had 
affirmatively elected for them to be present. So long as no state statute 
required, urged, or invited charters to undertake prayer, almost none of 
the reasoning of Engel is apropos to such a scenario. Prayer in freely 
chosen charter schools is therefore far from embodying the “official 
prescription” that Engel rejects. Rather, it instantiates the alternative 
approach to prayer that Engel celebrates: “[G]overnment in this country 
should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers 
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to 
those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.”245 
The precise concern of Mitchell is that the funding of such schools, 
rather than their practices per se, might constitute impermissible 
endorsement. Justice O’Connor long urged the partial displacement of 
Lemon in favor of a focus upon whether government is “conveying or 
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious 
belief is favored or preferred.”246 O’Connor’s question should be asked 
with respect to an “objective observer” who is acquainted with both “the 
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute” at issue and 
“with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes.”247 On the 
other hand, O’Connor’s formulation of the endorsement test requires 
that the religious message cannot be perceived under the statute “as 
drafted or as actually implemented.”248 Neoliberal plans that allowed 
religious chartering could have the effect of increasing the availability of 
religious options for students, sometimes dramatically so. 
What O’Connor’s objective observer would understand when faced 
with religious charters depends heavily upon the frame the observer 
deploys. Even absent a formalist work-around, such an observer would 
not be able to perceive endorsement based on the theory of charters, 
which is that a thousand flowers should bloom. Some charters will 
incorporate prayer into their school day, and various charters will 
choose prayers of various types; but other charters will not pray at all, 
and devote themselves instead to meditation, or microbiology, or mime. 
Seeing that the government had opened the field to a cornucopia of 
approaches, religious and nonreligious, O’Connor’s observer could 
hardly conclude that the state was endorsing any, including the religious 
 
 243 Id. at 432. 
 244 Id. at 425. 
 245 Id. at 435 (emphasis added). 
 246 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 247 Id. at 76, 83. 
 248 Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
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ones. This is quite different than the situation the same observer faced in 
Mitchell, where most of the schools receiving the aid at issue were 
religious.249 
Such an observer would not be confused by the practice of 
referring to charters as “public” into thinking that charters actually are 
public, in the traditional sense, because she would be paying attention to 
the legislative history of chartering and would understand this to be a 
misleading, if politically helpful, device.250 Nor would the observer be 
swayed into inferring from the fact of government funding, generous 
and on a per-pupil basis, and in most cases the overwhelming if not 
exclusive source of funds for the charter, either the reality or the 
impression that the charter is the state. Not only is this conclusion 
foreclosed by Zelman, but the thrust of the neoliberal turn is to place 
decisions in the hands of a market, albeit a subsidized one. The observer 
would understand that charter schools seek to satisfy their students, not 
the state. 
On the other hand, if the objective observer framed the funding of 
religious charters as an incremental change to prior funding schemes, 
she might well perceive endorsement, particular as the transition is 
“actually implemented.”251 Given that the requirement of strict 
secularism is among the greatest sources of discontent with American 
public schooling for a large segment of the public,252 a predominant 
effect of relaxing that restriction could well be to increase religious 
options. This is true a fortiori if there is a transition from current state 
law regimes, which allow charters but require them to be secular, to a 
regime that drops the secularism requirement in favor of a lesser 
requirement that sufficient secular seats be available in a school 
system.253 While under the theoretical frame this is merely an opening 
up or a deregulation of the market, the transitional frame makes it look 
like the state is having the effect (holding intent aside) of facilitating 
religion. 
It seems clear that the former frame is correct. The transitional 
frame would introduce a very strong small-“c” conservative bias into 
endorsement analysis: things that would have been allowed are 
forbidden because they were not done sooner. Moreover, transitional 
concerns can be expected to dissipate. As neoliberalism takes hold in 
American educational culture, more individuals, including ordinary 
parents, students, and citizens—and surely the attentive, informed 
observers among them—will increasingly understand that whatever 
 
 249 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 803 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 250 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 251 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 73 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 252 See infra Part V. 
 253 See infra Part III.C. 
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religious content exists as part of a system of choice is attributable to 
private, not state, preferences. 
And there can be no doubt that charter schools, and charter-school 
aid, are neutral. Some have claimed that voucher programs are sub rosa 
efforts to direct state funding to religious schools, even as they are 
officially justified in secular terms.254 These arguments, although 
rejected by the courts, can be made in good faith. In contrast, 
notwithstanding occasional blunderbuss to the contrary,255 there should 
be no dispute that charter schools were introduced and allowed to 
proliferate to achieve the secular goal of improving educational 
outcomes and expanding the range of educational choices available to 
parents.256 This is much clearer in the charter case than it was in Lemon, 
where a secular purpose was found for policies that authorized state 
payments to secular teachers in private (including religious) schools.257 
Indeed, as I discuss in Part IV, charters today are implemented pursuant 
to statutes that forbid them to engage in religious exercise. 
Because many states as a matter of positive law prohibit religious 
activity in charter schools,258 it might be possible to argue that charter 
statutes would fail to meet the requirement that government programs 
“must have a secular legislative purpose”259 were these prohibitions to be 
amended, or omitted in a new statute otherwise cognate with statutes in 
other states. But this narrow a view of “secular purpose” is deeply 
inconsistent with the case law.260 Justice Thomas has, with substantial 
support on the Court, urged neutrality as the proper interpretation of 
the secular purpose test. For Thomas, a statute is constitutional “if the 
government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers 
aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately 
further that purpose.”261 This is precisely what is offered by a chartering 
scheme that is silent as to religion or even explicitly provides that 
religious and nonreligious schools may be chartered on the same basis. 
More sweeping accounts of secular purpose in this instance yield similar 
conclusions. As Kent Greenawalt argues, a valid law must have “either a 
secular purpose (that is not only the remote objective of a more direct 
purpose to promote religion) or a purpose to accommodate religion in a 
permissible way.”262 It is untenable to argue that allowing religious and 
 
 254 See supra note 41. 
 255 Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 839 & n.103. 
 256 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-101(b) (West 2013). 
 257 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
 258 See infra Part IV.A. 
 259 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 260 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that the Court has “modified” and “recast” the secular purpose test of Lemon). 
 261 Id. at 810. 
 262 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 162. 
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nonreligious organizations to charter schools on the same basis is 
intended to promote religion under such a definition. A policy of 
enriching the totality of educational options, pursued for a decade 
without religious participation, is neutral with respect to religion.263 
One final reason not to allow Mitchell to block even “direct” aid to 
religious charter schools is that, though technically still good law, it no 
longer commands support on the Supreme Court. O’Connor’s Mitchell 
opinion is a quintessential expression of her long-held place as a swing 
voter situated between two four-Justice blocs. It seems very unlikely that 
Justice Samuel Alito, who replaced Justice O’Connor, shares her 
idiosyncratic view of Establishment,264 and quite likely that he would be 
sympathetic to the view of the four-Justice plurality in Mitchell that 
would have held that any program of direct aid is constitutional if 
neutral as to religion.265 
The first two Sections of this Part demonstrate that charter schools, 
although described by state legislatures, politicians, academic 
commentators, and some Justices as “public schools,” are allowed to do 
things that our legal culture has insisted for decades that public schools 
may not do. It is constitutional for charters to begin their day with 
formal prayer, publicly read the Bible, and teach children that religious 
propositions are true or false. A fortiori, charters constitutionally can 
also engage in the various marginal activities that have occupied the 
Supreme Court since the seventies with respect to public schools—
observing moments of silence,266 praying at school football games267 and 
graduations,268 and (perhaps) teaching “creation science.”269 So long as 
charter statutes and funding policies of the state neither intend, direct, 
encourage, nor discourage the content of charters’ decisions about 
religious practice or teaching, Supreme Court cases regarding religious 
activity in public schools do not apply to charters. 
C.     Secular Schools Must Be Available to All Comers 
The Zelman Court took the position that its opinion was not a 
major change in course, but simply the straightforward, easy extension 
of an “unbroken line of decisions rejecting challenges to similar 
 
 263 Cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (stating that the voucher 
program is “neutral in all respects toward religion”). 
 264 See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1286 (2008). 
 265 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 7–8. 
 266 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 267 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 268 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992). 
 269 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). I leave open the question whether states can 
neutrally regulate the teaching of the life sciences to exclude pseudo-scientific theorizing. 
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programs.”270 This view suggests that the opinion might not apply were 
its subject not a voucher experiment but a pervasive and full-blown 
charter sector. We know only a little about how a market equilibrium 
might look in such a world.271 One possibility is particularly important: 
that the sum of individual preferences in a local quasi-marketplace for 
charters might yield a system where all government-subsidized schools 
were religious. This does not seem likely; but neither, given the uneven 
geographical distribution of religious commitments across the country, 
does it seem fanciful. 
This possibility raises the specter of impermissible religious 
coercion and unconstitutional primary effects. Potential responses to 
that coercion, in which the government acts to ensure that secular 
education is available, also raise the possibility of impermissible 
entanglement. This Section considers these issues and concludes that 
states must subsidize, sponsor, or otherwise manage the school systems 
they fund so as to guarantee a free education in a fully secular setting to 
every child who wants one. However, states need not guarantee that 
every educational choice with religious content offered by a choice-
based system also be offered in a religion-free version. 
1.     Coercion 
Compulsory schooling is intrinsically coercive. State insistence that 
every child attend school cannot cloak a demand that any child engage 
in religious exercise. This has been important in the Court’s cases at 
least since Abington School District v. Schempp.272 Indeed, some cases 
indentify coercion as the key reason that the Court insists upon 
secularism in public schools: 
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, 
but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom 
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may 
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her 
family. . . . The State exerts great authority and coercive power 
through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the 
students’ emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s 
susceptibility to peer pressure.273 
 
 270 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). Contra id. at 687–88 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion “ignor[es]” or even “repudiate[s]” existing case 
law). 
 271 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 11; supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 272 374 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963). 
 273 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584. 
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The Court, moreover, has been generous in its appreciation of the 
potential forms coercion can take and skeptical that opting out can cure 
coerciveness. Students required to be in school but officially invited to 
stand by passively or even to absent themselves during a religious 
exercise are still, in the view of the Court, coerced.274 Beyond such 
formal in-school activities that create “indirect coercive pressure upon 
religious minorities to conform,”275 the Court has deemed unlawful the 
inclusion of religious elements in genuinely optional school-related 
events. In Lee v. Weisman the Court held that official prayer at a public 
school “formal graduation ceremon[y]” was inconsistent with the First 
Amendment,276 even though students were not required to be present.277 
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court similarly 
struck down a policy that allowed students collectively to agree to 
prayers at varsity football games and then elect a peer representative to 
deliver them.278 “[R]each[ing] past formalism,”279 these cases insist that 
to bundle religion with an activity that elicits in students a “genuine 
desire” to participate, or with respect to which they face “immense social 
pressure” from peers, is sufficient to constitute coercion.280 
The Court’s coercion doctrine therefore clearly requires every state 
that makes schooling compulsory to guarantee a secular education to 
every student who wants one. Under Weisman and Santa Fe, this option 
must be offered at the school, not the programmatic, level. It is 
insufficient to allow students to opt out of religious activities that a 
charter school conducts, lest they feel coerced to participate 
nevertheless. There must be enough seats in fully secular schools—
schools free from religion “root and branch”—to accommodate as many 
children who want them. 
The most straightforward way to ensure this, aside from 
prohibiting religious school choice altogether, is to continue to operate 
traditional public schools, available to all comers, alongside charters. 
Such schools, because they are government-run as well as government-
funded, perforce satisfy the requirement that secular schools be 
available. This is of course what every American jurisdiction now does. 
Although this practice is likely to persist indefinitely, going forward an 
all-charter system could arise, as developments in post-Katrina New 
Orleans suggest.281 In such a system the state would still have to 
guarantee sufficient secular seats for all takers. If necessary, it would 
 
 274 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
 275 Id. 
 276 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992). 
 277 Id. at 586, 593. 
 278 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2000). 
 279 Id. at 311 (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595). 
 280 Id. at 311–12 (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595, 593). 
 281 See Garda, supra note 61; supra text accompanying note 61. 
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have to meddle with the market mechanism, using subsidies, 
preferences in the chartering process, or other tools. Even in heavily 
religious areas, this should be feasible. 
The harder question is whether a system in which many but not all 
options available to children are religious can still be coercive even if 
there are enough seats in secular schools for all who desire them. In 
other words, is running traditional public schools alongside charters 
always sufficient to avoid unconstitutional coercion? In the alternative, 
were a hypothetical locality to abandon traditional public schooling in 
favor of an all-charter system, would it be constitutionally sufficient to 
offer to each student who requests secular schooling some seat in some 
secular charter school, or would more be required? 
The difficulty arises because each charter school with a religious 
component combines secular and religious elements. A spectrum of 
possible cases can be identified. At one end is a system in which every 
available charter that involves religious practice is twinned with a 
cognate school option materially identical in all respects except for 
being secular. At the (imaginary) extreme, materiality extends to all 
relevant characteristics of the school: academic program, but also 
disciplinary policy, culture, racial and economic characteristics of 
students and teachers, size, location, and so on. Such a system is clearly 
not religiously coercive. At the other end of the spectrum is a locality 
where the operation of a genuine quasi-market generates only religious 
schools. Doubtless in such circumstances the state must supplement 
such a market with a single secular alternative, just as it would have to 
do if most students in the district attended private religious schools. The 
question the latter possibility raises is whether public funding of the 
religious charters imposes additional duties upon the state beyond 
funding that one alternative. Is it unconstitutionally coercive for the 
state to present students with a binary choice between Execrable Public 
High and the Excellent Preparatory Academy when Excellent includes 
religious practice, making Execrable the only secular option? 
In between these extremes are a range of more realistic possibilities. 
The traditional public school could be far from execrable, but still 
dissimilar to various religious charter options. Consider a hypothetical 
charter school that focuses, for example, on both evangelism and 
environmental science.282 Would this particular bundling of sacred and 
secular lead a student passionate about the environment to feel 
unconstitutionally “coerced” to accept (or to urge her parents to accept) 
some evangelism in order to pursue environmentalism, just as a student 
passionate about football might elect to endure an uncongenial prayer? 
Such potential coercion is not cured by the availability of a seat in 
 
 282 For examples of charter school themes, see infra note 352. 
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perfectly adequate traditional, but not environmentally-focused, public 
school. Similarly, a student who thrives in intimate surroundings might 
trade away her secular preference in order to escape Enormous Central 
High. Such students might be “coerced” even if they make the trade 
willingly. Coercion could occur, moreover, even if multiple secular 
options were generated by the quasi-market. The existence of a secular 
charter that emphasizes fine arts and another that focuses on French 
might leave our environmentally oriented but irreligious student still 
willing (or tempted) to swallow some evangelism to get environmental 
studies. 
It must be noted, moreover, that the “twinned” system cannot be 
realized. It seems fanciful as a practical matter, surely beyond the 
capacity of any school district. Indeed, it is fanciful in principle. Every 
school is different. Also, one reason that some religious private schools 
have the secular features they have is because they are part of a religious 
community; the religious principles that guide all the school’s activities 
shape its secular elements. These include both curricular approaches, 
like strategies for teaching reading or mathematics, and issues like 
discipline, grading, teachers’ authority, and feeling of community that 
constitute a school’s culture.283 Many religious educators’ work in these 
areas in today’s private schools is explicitly, purposefully, and inherently 
religious. A rule that no government-subsidized bundle can include 
religion without the availability of an equivalent nonreligious bundle is a 
rule that no bundle can include religion. 
Some of the Court’s dicta nevertheless suggest that anything short 
of the “twinned” system might be unconstitutionally coercive. Choosing 
a school imposes a more “difficult choice” than forgoing a football 
game.284 Team sports are “decidedly extracurricular,” unlike the choice 
of a school.285 Similar or greater “informal pressure” and “genuine 
desire[s]” might arise in connection with choosing a school than with 
attending graduation.286 If all that is necessary to “coerce” adolescents is 
for there to be some school program that poses a “difficult choice” or 
conflicts with a “genuine desire,” then our environmentally minded 
student would be coerced by the religious environmental charter 
regardless of her other options, unless one of those options is an 
otherwise similar secular environmental charter. Our small-school 
student would be coerced by the small charter absent a small secular 
high school. 
Other decisions suggest a different approach. The most striking is 
Zelman, which actually sits very close to one of the limiting cases in the 
 
 283 See JONES, supra note 12. 
 284 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312. 
 285 Id. at 311. 
 286 Id. 
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spectrum of coercion suggested above. In Zelman, the secular options 
offered students were abysmal traditional district schools287 and 
chartered community schools that, from an academic point of view, 
were little better.288 The only “good” schools available to Cleveland 
public school students were, in fact, private, voucher-redeeming 
religious schools.289 The claim that the choice between good-and-
religious and bad-but-secular was inadequate, advanced enthusiastically 
by the dissenters, was outvoted. The Court was satisfied merely because 
there was “no record evidence that any voucher-eligible student was 
turned away from a nonreligious private school in the voucher program, 
let alone a community or magnet school.”290 It is not necessary to 
imagine some hypothetical family with a strong preference for academic 
quality and a weak preference against religion that would choose the 
religious option in such a circumstance; the existence of such families 
was documented in the Zelman record.291 The Court upheld the voucher 
program nevertheless. 
Nor does the result in Zelman depend on the availability of 
multiple secular options. The charters as well as the traditional public 
schools of Cleveland were secular; this might distinguish the case from 
one where a single nonreligious school is the only alternative to a host of 
religious charters. But the Zelman Court does not seem to rely upon 
this. Had the charters not existed, the result would have been the 
same.292 
How can these two strands of dicta be reconciled, one that calls any 
difficult decision imposed by the state with religion among the options 
“coercive” and the other untroubled by requiring students to choose, by 
action or inaction, between the “educational disaster” of publicly funded 
schools and the pervasively religious environment of a parochial school? 
It is facile, I think, to peg the differences to the passage of time and 
changing membership on the Court. Rather, two factors seem 
important. One is that families, not children themselves, choose schools 
in charter or voucher systems, unlike the choices about football games 
and graduations made primarily by students in Santa Fe and Weisman. 
Children are susceptible to peer pressure in a way that their parents are 
not; and families make their school choice deliberately and privately, 
rather than in the hothouse, parent-free environment within a school’s 
halls. 
 
 287 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002); id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 288 Id. at 702 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 289 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 13. 
 290 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 291 See infra note 336. 
 292 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Even more important, it seems to me, is that school choice is an 
institutional effort to expand, not contract, the choices available to 
students. A charter system usually grows the set of secular options for 
students, and even in the limiting case does not shrink it. In Santa Fe 
and Weisman, by contrast, when the choice is prohibited, what is likely 
left is the secular football game and the secular graduation. This 
distinction appears to have driven the Zelman Court’s lack of interest in 
coercion. Of course, this ignores second-order effects: if religious 
choices are not available, there will be more political pressure for good 
public schools. But second-order effects do not impact the coercion 
experienced by families and children. 
The upshot of this analysis is that just as secular public schools are 
not required to establish or encourage schools that match the secular 
elements of the programs of religious schools that are privately managed 
and privately funded, they also need not match the secular program of 
religious charter schools, privately managed but publicly funded.293 In 
the most important instance, if there is a charter of high academic 
quality that includes religious practice, there need not also be a secular 
school of equally high quality. All that is necessary is that there be a 
secular program large and flexible enough that any student whose 
family prefers secular to religious education can secure a seat in some 
secular school. 
2.     Entanglement and Primary Effects 
The First Amendment prohibits excessive state “entanglement” 
with religion. Entanglement concerns are not directly raised by public 
regulation of religiously oriented charter schools, as routine state 
accreditation and regulation of traditional parochial schools 
demonstrates.294 But one might worry that the obligation to assure a 
secular program for all students wanting one, described in the previous 
Section, could foster unconstitutional entanglement. This is a relatively 
minor concern in areas where there is substantial population density 
and reasonable religious diversity, so that a choice program unregulated 
as to religious content generates the needed secular alternatives without 
government intervention. But as noted above, in areas of the United 
States that are deeply and homogeneously religious, a quasi-market 
might generate only religious schools of choice. States might then need 
 
 293 A similar conclusion is advanced with regard to faith-based prison programs in Volokh, 
supra note 88, at 814–15. 
 294 See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764–65 (1976); 2 GREENAWALT, supra 
note 91, at 179. 
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to intervene in the market mechanism. Even in such circumstances, 
however, an entanglement problem seems farfetched. 
The regulatory need to assure sufficient secular seats in a quasi-
market would not deeply engage state regulators in the operation of 
religious schools. To determine whether the state faced a situation 
where the quasi-market itself did not generate sufficient secular options, 
and how large a secular option must therefore be provided, the 
government would need only determine that particular charter schools 
had religion in their program. This is hardly the “‘excessive’ 
entanglement,”295 “pervasive monitoring,”296 or “close and continuing 
surveillance of religious activities” by government297 that is 
constitutionally problematic. It intrudes government into charters’ 
operations far less than the supervision of secular teachers working in 
religious school buildings that was approved in Agostini.298 
Moreover, there is doubt whether entanglement, on its own 
without intent or endorsement, remains a constitutional violation. The 
Lemon test, while never formally overruled, itself lives in a twilight of 
constitutional doubt. Justice O’Connor argued in 1997 that 
entanglement should be treated not as a separate inquiry but as an 
“aspect” of Lemon’s “primary effects” test299: a state program may not 
have among its primary effects the advancement or inhibition of 
religion. Four Justices reiterated this view in 2000.300 This test would 
clearly be met, for the reasons given above, by charters in many 
cosmopolitan, dense communities. What about more homogenous and 
religious communities where quasi-markets, by hypothesis, might yield 
mostly religious charters, supplemented by a single traditional public 
school or a relatively small set of secular options? There the “primary 
effect” of such a program might appear to be to advance religious 
education. 
It is unlikely that the Court would be troubled by such an effect. 
First, there is a question of denominator: Is the primary effect of 
allowing quasi-markets statewide to advance religion if it has a 
cosmopolitan effect in the big cities but a mostly religious effect in some 
smaller communities? More important, since Mueller v. Allen301 the 
Court has been unremittingly hostile to the possibility that an otherwise 
constitutional policy can be rendered suspect because the sum of private 
choices pursuant to that policy have a religious cast. For constitutional 
 
 295 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1997). 
 296 Id. at 233. 
 297 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 179. 
 298 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
 299 Id. at 233; cf. 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 178 (“It is hard to know how much 
difference [O’Connor’s recharacterization] may make.”). 
 300 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 301 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
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purposes, the effects of a market or quasi-market must be divorced from 
the contingent choices actually made by market participants. It would 
be “absurd” to hold that “a neutral school-choice program might be 
permissible” in places where the ratio of secular to religious schools was 
high but not in other places where, owing to market demand, the ratio 
“happens to be” low.302 Any religious skew in the pattern of private 
choices, so long as that skew is not introduced by government, is 
constitutionally “irrelevant.”303 
IV.     THE CHARTER QUASI-MARKET 
I have argued to this point that, as a matter of federal constitutional 
law, states constitutionally may fund charter schools that teach religion 
and sponsor religious observance. This does not imply that states must 
do so. Either option is constitutional. Although states today universally 
elect to limit funding to charter schools that are secular, a correct 
understanding of the application of the First Amendment to charters 
would probably lead some, but not most, to loosen those prohibitions. 
But others will maintain their current statutes. The current uniform 
state preference for secularism in charters cannot be attributed entirely, 
or even mostly, to confusion about what the First Amendment requires. 
This does not, however, moot the question of charters and religion. 
Although charters are regulated, they remain privately managed. States 
are substantially less well positioned to regulate efforts to test the 
church/state boundary when state-regulated private entrepreneurs, 
rather than elected officials and bureaucrats, make fine-grained 
decisions about how schools will run. State efforts to maintain 
secularism in the charter sector will be constrained both by the practical 
limitations of their regulatory toolkit and, potentially, by federal First 
Amendment rules. The demands of the charter quasi-market and the 
creativity of its participants will give rise to diverse and ingenious efforts 
to bring publicly-funded education and religious activity closer together. 
States will be hard-pressed to maintain the level of secular dominance 
that characterized Progressive education in a neoliberal context. 
A.     States May Elect to Deny Charters to Religious Schools 
Even within a Progressive framework, it is possible to argue that 
the First Amendment or its values require states that fund public, 
secular schools also fund religious schooling for those who desire it. 
 
 302 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 657 (2002). 
 303 Id. at 658. 
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Professor Michael McConnell and others famously argued that funding 
secular but not religious education is a negative subsidy on 
constitutionally protected religious exercise, and therefore potentially an 
unconstitutional condition.304 Although a state could restrict its funding 
only to secular, Progressive schools if it had a “good faith” belief that 
such schools were superior to private schools in realizing goals 
“unrelated to religion” such as integrating students or teaching 
citizenship, on McConnell’s theory it could not do so in order to 
discourage the consumption of religious schooling.305 
This argument, however compelling, is at odds with the enormous 
weight of the case law and gained little traction.306 But the rise of school 
choice spurred variations on the claims that distinguished neoliberal 
from Progressive contexts. Some scholars argue that although it is 
constitutional for states to fund only “public education,” it is less clear 
that states, having chosen also to fund “private schools,” can limit such 
funding to secular institutions.307 This argument appeals regardless 
whether one thinks religion should be treated no differently than other 
sorts of personal commitments308 or that the Constitution accords 
special status to religious beliefs.309 
Claims that states that fund private schools cannot exclude 
religious ones took substantial energy from Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the University of Virginia,310 in which the Court held that a 
public university that underwrote student publications could not 
withhold funds from a publication that proselytized so long as the latter 
met the general eligibility requirements for subsidy.311 I think 
Rosenberger is deeply relevant to charter school regulation, for reasons I 
suggest below.312 But the particular argument that a neutral program of 
school aid cannot exclude religious schools because of their religiosity 
 
 304 Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1018 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: 
Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255, 269, 271, 
275 (1989) [hereinafter McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions]; see also MARK G. YUDOF ET 
AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 116 n.1 (2012) (collecting literature); Laycock, supra 
note 3, at 187. 
 305 McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 304, at 269. 
 306 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 172 & n.100. 
 307 Jesse H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROVERSY, supra note 100, at 235, 248–49; accord Tushnet, supra note 95, at 15–21. This 
debate transcends the educational context. See Tebbe, supra note 264, at 1265 (identifying 
exclusion of religion from general funding programs as “an incipient constitutional issue”). 
 308 The canonical exposition of this view is Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, 
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994). 
 309 McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power, supra note 38, at 854. 
 310 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 311 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 169–70 (discussing Rosenberger); Tebbe, supra note 264, at 
1303–06 (same); Tushnet, supra note 95, at 18 (same). 
 312 See infra notes 383–385 and accompanying text. 
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has been substantially impeded by Locke v. Davey, decided by the 
Supreme Court in 2004.313 In Davey, the Court upheld a program of 
graduate scholarships that provided state monies to post-secondary 
students pursuing their chosen fields, but that excluded students 
choosing to pursue a “theology degree.”314 The Court held that the “play 
in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses315 
permitted, but did not require, states so to exclude religious education 
from otherwise neutral programs of subsidy for study. 
There is ample room to argue that Davey does not extend to the 
charter school context. The program at issue in Davey excluded degrees 
in theology, not theology courses; the opinion explicitly notes that the 
program permitted “students to attend pervasively religious schools, so 
long as they are accredited.”316 In the K–12 context, even the most 
pervasively religious of charters is not only accredited but spends large 
amounts of time teaching secular subjects.317 For the same reasons it 
would be impossible to describe a religious charter student as engaging 
in “an essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling as well 
as an academic pursuit”—the Court’s description of Mr. Davey’s 
program of study.318 And, as Professor McConnell argues, refusing to 
fund religious charters is to do what the Davey Court said the 
Washington program did not do, namely to “require students to choose 
between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”319 
Nevertheless, Professor Laycock is convincing when he argues that 
these persuasive distinctions are likely to be ignored.320 The 
“impressionistic and aesthetic” reading of Davey—that it entitles states 
to exclude religious schools from programs that provide otherwise 
general funding to schools or students—is likely to prevail for some 
time.321 
Certainly the state charter school statutes now in force ubiquitously 
require charters to be secular. Most explicitly require charters to be 
“nonsectarian” or “nonreligious,”322 and it is likely that most of the 
 
 313 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see Tebbe, supra note 264, at 1266–67, 1306–07 (noting that 
Rosenberger and Davey are “in tension”). 
 314 Davey, 540 U.S. at 718. 
 315 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
 316 Id. at 724. 
 317 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 184–85. 
 318 Davey, 540 U.S. at 721. 
 319 Id. at 720–21. 
 320 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 185–87. 
 321 Id. at 186–87 & n.193 (collecting cases). 
 322 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(E)(2) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-103(4)(B) 
(2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(d)(1) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(1) 
(2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66aa(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 506(a)(2) (2012); FLA. 
STAT. § 1002.33(9)(a) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2062(2) (2012); IND. CODE § 20-24-1-4 
(2012); IOWA CODE § 256F.4(2)(b) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3991(C)(5) (2012); MD. 
CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-102(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 124D.10(b)(2), subdiv. 8(d) (2012); 
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remainder assume that their requirement that charter schools be 
“public” includes a prohibition on religious activity. Some states 
probably impose such requirements in the mistaken but conventional 
belief that the First Amendment requires them to do so.323 But they have 
other reasons as well. A significant number of state constitutions restrict 
public funding of religious institutions more rigorously than does the 
federal Constitution, although scholars differ regarding how many of 
these states’ provisions will be understood to prevent subsidies that 
ultimately flow to religious education.324 These limitations would fall in 
their entirety, of course, if the First Amendment is read to require 
funding of religious and secular entities on equal terms, or if the state 
constitutional provisions themselves are infirm under the First 
Amendment—but both these possibilities, although the subject of 
robust theoretical debate, remain remote in practice.325 On the standard 
reading of Davey and the constitutionality of “Blaine amendments” and 
cognate state provisions, states may under federal law choose to 
foreclose religious participation in charter programs, and therefore 
whether they must do so depends upon the religion jurisprudence each 
state has developed under its own constitution.326 
States also have fiscal and political reasons for maintaining an all-
secular chartering system. Ten percent of American children are 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 160.405(4)(1) (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III) (2013); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4(J) (2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2)(a) (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3314.029(A)(1)(d) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(2) (2012); 24 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1715-A(4)–(5) (West 2012) (“A charter school shall be nonsectarian in 
all operations . . . [and] shall not provide any religious instruction, nor shall it display religious 
objects and symbols.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(d) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-40(1) 
(2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-507(1) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.5(B) 
(2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.40(4)(a)(2) (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-304(a) (2012); cf. NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 386.505(3) (2011) (prohibiting “formation of charter schools on the basis of a 
single race, religion or ethnicity”). But cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.522(1) (2012) (“To the 
extent disqualified under the state or federal constitution, an urban high school academy shall 
not be organized by a church or other religious organization and shall not have any 
organizational or contractual affiliation with or constitute a church or other religious 
organization.” (emphasis added)). 
 323 Notable here is New Hampshire’s incorporation, in its chartering statute, of the federal 
Lemon test as the method of “determining whether a proposed chartered public school is a 
prohibited religious school.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:7 (2012). 
 324 See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: 
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 555–57 (2003); 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 201, 218 (2010); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian 
Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 959–60 
(2003) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman’s Future]. Some scholars also continue to argue that 
these state bars are themselves unconstitutional. 
 325 See Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman’s Future, supra note 324, at 969–70. On the possible 
unconstitutionality of state “Little Blaine Amendments” that bar state funding of sectarian 
organizations, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion); 
Tushnet, supra note 95, at 15–18 (discussing Justice Thomas’s Mitchell opinion). 
 326 See Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman’s Future, supra note 324, at 960 & nn.198–99. 
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enrolled in private school, and roughly eighty-five percent of those 
attend schools with religious affiliations.327 These students’ parents are a 
fiscal blessing to states and localities: they forgo expensive government 
services while still paying taxes. If religious schools could easily recast 
themselves as charters and thereby gain access to public funding, the 
drain on education budgets would be both substantial and sudden.328 
Some states address this problem by prohibiting the conversion of 
existing private schools to charters;329 but since parents can switch 
schools, this is only a partial fix. 
Finally, there are nonfiscal ideological and political reasons for 
excluding religious education from charter programs. States may have 
separationist preferences. They may wish not to fund the educational 
practices of particular minority sects. They may have no stomach for 
litigation or controversy in this area. They may think that 
nonsectarianism enhances public support for charters. There are many 
other possible motivations. 
It seems plausible to think that many or all of these factors help 
motivate the requirement in state positive law that charters not be 
religious. A correct understanding of the application of the First 
Amendment to charters would not lead all states to change course. But 
the mistaken view that charters cannot be religious surely has an effect. 
Its correction would surely move some states towards relaxing the 
nonsectarianism requirement, especially those where the agenda of 
evangelical Christian educators330 and their allies331 is strong. This 
coalition’s clout has led several states and districts systematically to 
resist the First Amendment constraints on Progressive education.332 
Should voters and elected officials in these areas come to view religious 
chartering as constitutional, the requirement that charters be secular 
would likely be loosened in a significant number of jurisdictions. 
 
 327 See Facts and Studies, CAPE: COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE EDUCATION, 
http://www.capenet.org/facts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (citing reports from the National 
Center for Education Statistics, containing data for the 2009–2010 school year). 
 328 See JANET D. MULVEY, BRUCE S. COOPER & ARTHUR T. MALONEY, BLURRING THE LINES: 
CHARTER, PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS COMING TOGETHER 32 (2010) 
(documenting concern in New York City over “the stress that would be placed on public 
schools if all students from . . . closed Catholic schools entered the public school system”). 
 329 See infra note 370. 
 330 See STEPHEN ARONS, SHORT ROUTE TO CHAOS: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND THE RE-
CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 55–58 (1997); ROBERT WUTHNOW, RED STATE 
RELIGION: FAITH AND POLITICS IN AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 295–97, 303–11 (2012). 
 331 See MELISSA M. DECKMAN, SCHOOL BOARD BATTLES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN LOCAL 
POLITICS 16 (2004). 
 332 See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: 
FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 31–32 & fig.7 (1971); 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, 
at 106. 
SAIGER.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013  12:06 PM 
2013] C H A R T E R S  AN D  T H E  N E O L I BE R AL  TU R N  1215 
B.     The Limits of Regulatory Oversight 
That states are entitled to exclude religious schools from chartering 
does not end the matter. Chartering, and educational neoliberalism 
more generally, shift decisionmaking power from public to private 
actors. Private actors determine how charters behave; government 
regulates, but does not make, those determinations. Because demand for 
religious schooling is large, one expects educational entrepreneurs to 
create schools that come as close as possible to meeting that demand, 
subject to their regulatory constraints. Charter schools will therefore 
push against limitations upon their religious activity. States will find it 
difficult, and even potentially unlawful, fully to prevent such moves—if 
they even want to, which not all states will.333 
This is not to say that regulatory power is insubstantial. If state law 
forbids “sectarian” or “religious” charter schools, then a charter school 
cannot organize itself as a religious private school does. It cannot 
organize prayers, nor can it teach the truth of the Bible or of other 
religious propositions. But these are not the only things that religious 
schools do, nor are they only things that draw parents towards religious 
schools. Religious schools have unique substantive and procedural 
approaches to teaching culture, inculcating values, and maintaining 
discipline.334 They emphasize particular topics and approaches in 
teaching social studies, literature, history, and science.335 Especially 
important, their students often reach high levels of academic 
achievement.336 A school that cannot pray or teach religious truth will 
probably not appeal to the core constituencies of existing private 
religious schools that enroll in order to provide their children with 
religious education. But such a school could easily enjoy broad appeal 
among more marginal consumers that appreciate these other aspects of 
religious education—with the added enticement of being tuition-free. 
These parents, like all parent-consumers in a quasi-market, have buying 
power to which charter entrepreneurs will respond. 
 
 333 See Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 839 & n.103. 
 334 See JONES, supra note 12, at 40, 43. 
 335 See id. at 43, 117, 152–53. 
 336 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PRESERVING A CRITICAL NATIONAL ASSET: AMERICA’S 
DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND THE CRISIS IN FAITH-BASED URBAN SCHOOLS 6–8 (2008); 
Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and 
Education Reform, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 901 (2010); cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A]lmost two out of three families using vouchers [in 
Cleveland] to send their children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of those 
schools. The families made it clear they had not chosen the schools because they wished their 
children to be proselytized in a religion not their own, or in any religion, but because of 
educational opportunity.” (citations to the record omitted)); Garnett, supra note 324, at 214 
(implying that her mostly Catholic neighbors enroll their children in Catholic schools more 
because of the schools’ record of academic achievement than their families’ religiosity). 
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This is no theoretical exercise. Across the country, charter schools 
have been established that begin with a religious program and then strip 
out its explicitly religious elements. More than a trivial residue remains. 
Charter schools with roots in both the Catholic and Protestant 
educational establishments, for example, find substitutes when they 
forgo prayer and explicit Christian instruction.337 When the Trinidad 
Campus of the Center City Public Charter School in Washington, D.C. 
morphed from Catholic to charter school, it replaced the Lord’s Prayer 
with students’ daily recital of a promise to “pursue personal excellence 
in character, conduct and scholarship.”338 But Trinidad maintains a 
school “shrine . . . dedicated to the school’s core values: collaboration, 
compassion, curiosity, discipline, integrity, justice, knowledge, 
peacemaking, perseverance and respect.”339 The school also maintained 
the leftover “stone cross at the entrance of the school,” and continues to 
employ the same teachers and nuns that worked for the building’s 
former tenants.340 Likewise, the Nampa Charter School in Idaho denies 
that it is a “Christian school,” but deploys curriculum and training 
developed for private Christian schools, teaches Latin, and forbids sex 
education.341 It also includes the Bible among the “major text[s]” of 
Western civilization in its history classes,342 accepting the invitation of 
the Court in Abington School District v. Schempp to deploy the Bible as a 
secular text.343 
Schools like these, whether spun off from private religious schools 
or free-standing, have been described as “religious/cultural charters”344 
and, more critically, as “religious schools-lite.”345 They have been 
especially attractive to religious minorities. For such groups, it is of 
 
 337 Discrete Christian denominations, such as the Mormons and the Amish, are also 
involved in chartering. See FINN, MANNO & VANOUREK, supra note 52, at 161. 
 338 MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 29. 
 339 Id. 
 340 Id.; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Are Charters Enough Choice? School Choice and the 
Future of Catholic Schools, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1891–93 (2012) (documenting a 
similar transformation of a Catholic school to a charter school in Indianapolis); Sugarman & 
Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 875 (noting concern over charters that rent religious buildings 
whose “pupils . . . [are] largely drawn from the congregation of the landlord”). But see Carolyn 
Slutsky, Hebrew Charter School to Displace Shul, N.Y. JEWISH WK., July 22, 2009 (on file with 
author) (Hebrew-language charter insisting upon the removal of all religious symbols from a 
rented synagogue before taking possession). 
 341 MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 96. 
 342 Id. at 35. 
 343 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its 
literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said . . . indicates that . . . study of the Bible or 
of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be 
effected consistently with the First Amendment.”). 
 344 Marcia J. Harr Bailey & Bruce S. Cooper, The Introduction of Religious Charter Schools: A 
Cultural Movement in the Private School Sector, 18 J. RES. ON CHRISTIAN EDUC. 272, 272 (2009). 
 345 Charles J. Russo & Gerald M. Cattaro, Faith-Based Charter Schools, 36 RELIGION & EDUC. 
72, 83 (2009). 
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critical religious importance to maintain cultural and linguistic 
traditions that are confessionally fundamental, but technically secular, 
in content.346 Bailey and Cooper identify such charters founded by 
Muslim, Jewish, Greek Orthodox, and Hmong communities.347 These 
schools teach “the history, customs, and language of the religion during 
the required school day.”348 They all eschew school-organized prayer 
and the teaching of religious truths, but differ to a significant extent in 
the extent to which they push the religious/secular boundary. Some 
schools display symbols that straddle that line, observe religious dietary 
laws in their cafeterias, and/or close for religious holidays—and others 
do not.349 A well-studied Islamic charter school, the Tarek Ibn Ziyad 
academy, found itself in court over its policy of, while not sponsoring 
prayers directly, recessing formal classes and providing space for 
student-organized worship.350 Some Hebrew charter schools err in the 
other direction, not requiring Hebrew language instruction but merely 
offering it as an elective.351  
The teaching of languages with special religious import but that are 
also secular tongues—Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, Latin—is particularly 
significant because an important attraction of charter schools is their 
ability to organize themselves around particular themes or topics.352 
Chartering invites niche marketing, even to idiosyncratic interests, so 
long as schools can command students in the quasi-marketplace.353 One 
 
 346 See, e.g., MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE, supra note 27, at 105 (describing religious 
separatist Jews seeking their own school district for reasons “of religious, linguistic, and cultural 
identity”). 
 347 Bailey & Cooper, supra note 344, at 272. 
 348 Id. at 277. 
 349 See Benjamin Siracusa Hillman, Note, Is There a Place for Religious Charter Schools?, 118 
YALE L.J. 554, 570 (2008). It is important to note that traditional public schools with substantial 
enrolment from discrete religious minorities sometimes follow similar practices. See, e.g., 
MICHAEL S. MERRY, CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND ISLAMIC SCHOOLING: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
APPROACH 26 (2007) (noting that the two public high schools in Dearborn, Michigan “offers 
[sic] bilingual classes in Arabic, accommodate Islamic holidays, excuse those students who are 
inclined toward Friday prayers, and offer halal meat in its [sic] cafeteria”). 
 350 See id. at 565; Bailey & Cooper, supra note 344, at 279–80. 
 351 See Julie Wiener, L.A. Charter Tests Genre, N.Y. JEWISH WK., May 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/national/la_charter_tests_genre. 
 352 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1903(b) (2012) (“A charter school also may be organized 
around a special emphasis, theme or concept . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1-a(III) 
(2013) (stating that one purpose of chartering is to “[e]ncourage the establishment 
of . . . schools with specific or focused curriculum, instruction, methods, or target pupil 
groups”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(3) (2012) (“A charter school may offer a curriculum 
which emphasizes a specific learning philosophy or style or certain subject areas such as 
mathematics, science, fine arts, performance arts, or foreign language.”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-13-104(1) (2012) (providing for charters with “a distinctive, thematic program”). 
 353 See, e.g., FINN, MANNO & VANOUREK, supra note 52, at 163; Karen Abercrombie, In A 
Detroit Suburb, an Automaker’s Vision Gets New Life, EDUC. WK., Mar. 4, 1998, at 6 (reporting 
on a charter school based on manufacturing); Ray Parker, Unique Charter School Offers Lessons 
in Horse Sense, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/
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of the most significant niches is filled by charters whose programs, 
though open to all, reflect the interests of specific racial, ethnic, and 
linguistic identity groups.354 Hebrew- and Arabic-language charters in 
particular are presented, with some justification, as catering to linguistic 
and ethnic, as much as religious, cultures. Dean Minow, for example, 
includes them in her discussion of charters that emphasize Spanish and 
Chinese.355 
Some of these same charters, however, have found ways to 
supplement their programs with privately provided religious education. 
This practice honors legal boundaries but still provides the 
religious/secular synthesis previously monopolized by private religious 
schools. For example, private providers sometimes offer programs of 
afterschool religious education exclusively to students in a particular 
“religious/cultural charter.”356 Some charters insist that such programs 
be provided off-site, to emphasize their formal separation from the 
publicly subsidized program; others feel no such compunctions.357 
More inventively, entrepreneurs have deployed the “cyber” or 
“virtual” charter form to religious (and competitive) advantage. 
Providing instruction online rather than through physical teacher/pupil 
interaction is a still-small but growing trend in K–12 education, and one 
rapidly taking on outsize importance.358 Sensing its potential to realize 
cost savings, improve access, and allow educational customization, a 
number of states are experimenting with virtual education, and most of 
these permit its use by charter as well as traditional public schools.359 
 
articles/2009/10/01/20091001mr-equineskl1002.html (reporting on a charter based on equine 
and veterinary subjects). 
 354 See RAVITCH, supra note 42, at 124–25 (“Ethnic groups embraced [charter schools] as a 
refuge in which to teach their cultural heritage.”); Bruce Fuller, Growing Charter Schools, 
Decentering the State, in INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE PARADOX OF RADICAL 
DECENTRALIZATION 1, 7 (Bruce Fuller ed., 2000). 
 355 MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE, supra note 27, at 45. 
 356 See MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 97 (noting efforts by New Orleans 
Baptist Missions to form charters by “adopting an existing school”); Julie Wiener, For Charters’ 
Jewish Cousins, So Near, So Far, N.Y. JEWISH WK., Dec. 28, 2010, available at http://www.the
jewishweek.com/print/14288 (surveying this practice at Hebrew-language charter schools and 
reporting that such programs attract between twenty and thirty percent of students in the 
charters). 
 357 See Wiener, supra note 356. 
 358 JAY GREENE ET AL., BROWN CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y AT BROOKINGS, EXPANDING CHOICE IN 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: A REPORT ON RETHINKING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN 
EDUCATION 16 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/
0202_school_choice/0202_school_choice.pdf; PAUL PETERSON, SAVING SCHOOLS: FROM 
HORACE MANN TO VIRTUAL LEARNING 231–34 (2010); J. SCHNITZ, & J.E. YOUNG, MODELS OF 
VIRTUAL SCHOOLING (1999), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/industries/ca/en/education/
k12/pdf/virtualschool.pdf; Aaron J. Saiger, Changing the Conversation in Education Law: 
Political Geography and Virtual Schooling, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 337, 355–57 (2012) [hereinafter 
Saiger, Changing the Conversation]. 
 359 See FLA. STAT. §§ 1002.33, 1002.45(d (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5205(1)(b) (2012); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 124D.095, 124D.10 (2012) (extending state “Online Learning Option Act” to 
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Most cyber-schools are charters,360 and these schools serve tens of 
thousands of students.361 
In the context of religious education, asynchronicity is a key aspect 
of cyber-schooling. Asynchronous charter students can log on for 
school at times and places of their own choosing, in the cyber-analogue 
to the pre-internet correspondence course.362 Steven L. Jones 
provocatively calls virtual charters “public schools in the home”;363 but 
although most virtual instruction takes place at home, it need not. 
Asynchronicity allows students in a private religious school each to 
enroll in a secular cybercharter, as individuals, and receive their secular 
education at times and places as directed by the religious teaching staff, 
even as religious instruction itself remains privately funded.364 A 
 
charters); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.079, 3302.41 (West 2012) (defining “blended 
learning” as “the delivery of instruction in a combination of time in a supervised physical 
location away from home and online delivery whereby the student has some element of control 
over time, place, path, or pace of learning” and allowing community schools to use a “blended 
learning model”); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 329.840, 338.005 (2012) (creating the Oregon Virtual 
School District and granting access to it to “public charter schools”; also creating “virtual public 
charter schools” that provide online courses and have no physical location); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 17-1741-A to 17-1751-A (rules for “cyber charter schools”) (West 2012); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 59-40-40 (2012) (inviting charters to provide “virtual services”); WIS. STAT. § 118.40(8) 
(2011). Contra MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-1401(c), 7-1402(a), 9-102(12) (West 2013) 
(authorizing “virtual schools” but allowing only “county board[s]” to sponsor them, whereas 
charter schools must “[r]equir[e] students to be physically present on school premises for a 
period of time substantially similar to that which other public school students spend on school 
premises.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-106(c)(2) (2012) (“No cyber-based public charter 
school may be authorized.”). See generally Thomas Clark, Virtual Schooling and Basic 
Education, in ECONOMICS OF DISTANCE AND ONLINE LEARNING: THEORY PRACTICE, AND 
RESEARCH 52, 57–58 (William J. Bramble & Santosh Panda eds., 2008) (detailing reach of 
online charters); Greene et al., supra note 358 (advocating a substantial expansion of virtual 
chartering). 
 360 See JOHN WATSON, BUSH GEMIN & JENNIFER RYAN, KEEPING PACE WITH K–12 ONLINE 
LEARNING: A REVIEW OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY AND PRACTICE 8 (2008). 
 361 See id.; SLOAN CONSORTIUM, K–12 ONLINE LEARNING: A 2008 FOLLOW-UP OF THE 
SURVEY OF U.S. SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS 1 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.sloanconsortium.org/sites/default/files/k-12_online_learning_2008.pdf (presenting 
data from a survey of school districts during the 2007–2008 finding that 75% of responding 
districts had at least one student enrolled in an online or blended course and that two-thirds of 
these districts expect growth in online enrollments); Garnett, supra note 340, at 1899 (reporting 
a 2008 count of “185 ‘virtual’ charter schools in twenty-five states”); Trip Gabriel, More Pupils 
Are Learning Online, Fueling Debate on Quality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at A1 (reporting 
estimate of 1 million students involved in some form of online or blended education). These 
schools bring their share of disputes. See Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online 
Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A1; State Moves to Shut Down Minn.’s First 
Online Charter, EDUC. WK., Mar. 16, 2011, at 4; Dakarai I. Aarons, Colo. Charter Dispute Stirs 
Oversight Issues; Riven by Firings, Infighting, Noted School Network Is Challenge for Authorizers, 
EDUC. WK., Oct. 7, 2009, at 8. 
 362 See BURCH, supra note 36, at 77; WATSON, GEMIN & RYAN, supra note 360, at 10; Edward 
Lin, Comment, “Virtual” Schools: Real Discrimination, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 178 (2008) 
(cataloging secular motivations for online schooling). 
 363 JONES, supra note 12, at 89. 
 364 See Saiger, Changing the Conversation, supra note 358, at 359. 
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handful of religious schools have adopted this model,365 which allows 
the interpenetration of secular and religious instruction: 
[A] religious teacher might work with half the class on some religious 
topic while the other half, on its own for the moment, engages in 
secular cyber-study under the teacher’s passive supervision. Or a 
cleric might begin a 45-minute English lesson with a prayer—right 
before secular studies begin—or interrupt a cyber-biology lesson to 
admonish students that “[t]his evolution bit is straight from 
Satan.”366 
Such environments could quite closely approximate the current 
practices of many pervasively religious private schools and religious 
homeschooling families. But while in the private and homeschooling 
contexts parents pay for secular studies (in the former case with their 
money and the latter with their time367), this model shifts these costs to 
the state. This potentially large reduction in parental costs could induce 
considerably more of them to seek religious schooling than do today.368 
Such strategies are extremely difficult for states to block by 
regulation, especially without impeding a large amount of desirable 
chartering activity. It is not just that regulatory limitations are subject to 
politics and lobbying;369 it is more that regulation is a blunt tool with 
which to confront the religiously-motivated entrepreneur. So, some 
states have forbidden religious private schools or private schools in 
general from converting to charters,370 as the Trinidad campus did.371 
 
 365 Julie Wiener, Has Tech Reached the Tipping Point?, N.Y. JEWISH WK., July 26, 2011, 
available at http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/new_york/has_tech_reached_tipping_point 
(describing an Orthodox Jewish yeshiva in Los Angeles that teaches religious studies using 
traditional face-to-face instruction from the first bell until 2 PM, whereupon all students pursue 
secular studies as cybercharter students under the physical supervision of the religious teaching 
staff). 
 366 Saiger, Changing the Conversation, supra note 358, at 359 (quoting Guy Lancaster, “This 
Evolution Bit is Straight from Satan”: McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education and the 
Democratization of Southern Christianity, 33 RELIGION & EDUC. 69, 84 (2006)). 
 367 See Michelle R. Davis, “Hybrid” Charter Schools on the Rise, EDUC. WK., June 15, 2011 
(reporting that families cannot take full advantage of virtual education without “ability to have 
their children at home or supervised in their workspace”). 
 368 See MERRY, supra note 349, at 28, 33, 38 (noting financial pressures on Islamic schools 
and parents); Garnett, supra note 340, at 1897 (noting similar pressures on Catholic schools); 
Jack Wertheimer, The High Cost of Jewish Living, COMMENTARY (Mar. 2010), at 17, 17–18 
(noting similar pressures on Jewish schools and parents), available at http://www.commentary
magazine.com/article/the-high-cost-of-jewish-living/. 
 369 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 715 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A day 
will come when religious schools will learn what political leverage can do . . . .”). 
 370 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 502 (2012) (“No 
private or religiously affiliated school may apply to become a charter school.”); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-2-2062(2) (2012) (stating “sectarian schools” and “religious schools” as well as “private for 
profit schools” and “existing private schools” may not petition for charter status); 105 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/27A-4(c) (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 89(d) (2012); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3314.01(A)(2) (West 2012) (“No nonpublic chartered or nonchartered school in 
existence on January 1, 1997, is eligible to become a community school under this chapter”); id. 
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States also sometimes forbid “home-based” institutions from seeking 
charters.372 Such bans essentially invite groups to reorganize and set up 
new schools rather than converting old ones,373 even as they can deprive 
the new schools of valuable assets, including appropriate real estate.374 
Two schools can have different corporate identities but still share, for 
example, the same directors, staff, or facilities.375 States can respond in 
turn by forbidding such arrangements also.376 But this, in addition to 
 
§ 3314.029(A)(1)(d) (charter applications must include “statement that the school . . . will not 
be operated by a sectarian school or religious institution”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-1717-A(a) (West 2012) (“No charter school shall be established or funded by and no 
charter shall be granted to any sectarian school, institution or other entity.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 16-77-3.1(d) (2012) (“No private or parochial schools shall be eligible for charter public 
school status”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-106(c)(1) (2012) (“No charter agreement shall be 
granted under this chapter that authorizes the conversion of any private, parochial, cyber-based 
or home-based school to charter status.”); WIS. STAT. § 118.40(3)(c)(2) (2011) (“A school board 
may not enter into a contract that would result in the conversion of a private, sectarian school 
to a charter school”). WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-303(c) (2012). 
 371 See J.C. Reindl, Knight Academy Charter School Scheduled to Open in West Toledo, 
TOLEDO BLADE, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.toledoblade.com/Education/2008/07/11/
Knight-Academy-charter-school-scheduled-to-open-in-West-Toledo.html (affiliation of a new 
charter with existing Catholic school). 
 372 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 506(a)(2) 
(2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2062(2) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 124D.10 subdiv. 8(e) (2012) 
(“Charter schools must not be used as a method of providing education or generating revenue 
for students who are being home-schooled.”) NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 386.505(1), 386.506 (2011); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22 8B 4(J) (2012); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 59-40-40(1) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-106(c)(1) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 53A-1a-504(3) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.5(B) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 21-3-303(c), 21-3-304(a) (2012). 
 373 See Christopher O’Donnell, The ‘C’ Will Stand for ‘Charter’ Next Year, SARASOTA 
HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 2, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/
20091102/ARTICLE/911021059 (reporting that rather than convert to a charter school, 
leadership of Palmetto Christian School in Florida “closing” the school in the summer and 
“opening Palmetto Charter School at the start of the new school year”); see also id. (noting 
seven similar closures-followed-by charter-openings by the Archdiocese of Miami). 
 374 Cf. GORDON, supra note 15, at 57 (stating that in the 1940s and 1950s, “[t]here were 
significant ties in many areas between public schools and Catholic educators,” and that local 
officials “[o]ften . . . used church buildings as public elementary and secondary schools”) 
 375 See Mary Shanklin & Vicki McClure, Deals and Debts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 
2007, at A1, available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-special-charterschools-part2,0,59
24982.htmlpage (reporting that Rio Grande Charter School of Excellence in Orlando FL “shares 
board members, facilities and funding with New Covenant Baptist Church”). 
 376 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.522 (2012) (“To the extent disqualified under the state or 
federal constitution, an urban high school academy shall not be organized by a church or other 
religious organization and shall not have any organizational or contractual affiliation with or 
constitute a church or other religious organization.”); MINN. STAT. § 124D.10 subdiv. 3(b)(2) 
(2012) (stating that charter organizers may not be “nonpublic sectarian or religious institution; 
any person other than a natural person that directly or indirectly, through one or more 
intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the nonpublic 
sectarian or religious institution; and any other charitable organization under this clause that in 
the federal IRS Form 1023, Part IV, describes activities indicating a religious purpose”); id. 
§ 124D.10 subdiv. 8(d) (“A charter school . . . authorizer may not authorize a charter school or 
program that is affiliated with a nonpublic sectarian school or a religious institution.”); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(b) (prohibiting charters “affiliated with a nonpublic sectarian 
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further depriving new charters of potentially important experience and 
support, mostly induces converting schools to replace formal affiliation 
or overlaps with informal ties.377 States worried that private schools 
might form or adopt charters for their students’ secular studies, while 
retaining their enrollment for religious education, have also sought to 
block that practice;378 once again, it seems fairly easy to reconfigure the 
private school as an extracurricular institute in order to evade such 
restrictions.379 These regulations resemble squeezing a balloon.380 
Ultimately, states cannot, even if they want to, prohibit adherents of a 
particular faith from participating in chartering. 
The other way that states could restrict charters that push the 
envelope of religious instruction is to exercise discretion in approving 
and denying charter applications. Such discretion is available and, in 
those states that impose quotas on the total number of charters,381 
unavoidable. But while in the Progressive context, discretion is used to 
avoid even hints of religiosity in schools that are the single free option 
for all, the same techniques, when deployed in the neoliberal context 
against private providers, can come to seem like antireligious animus. 
Of course, these charters are carefully not religious, as a technical 
matter. But that does not mean that opposition to chartering individuals 
and groups that appear to have roots in religious communities, or who 
have particular values, cannot be deemed anti-religious discrimination. 
The Court’s religion cases, up to and emphatically including Davey, 
disfavor regulatory burdens upon religious exercise of this nature.382 
The neoliberal structure of chartering also increases the salience of 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.383 The 
 
school or a religious institution”) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(2) (2012) (same); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 338.035(7) (2012) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(d) (2012) (same). 
 377 See MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 63–64 (reviewing the relationship 
between the Muslim American Society of Minnesota and the Tarek ibn Ziyad school); Jennifer 
Smith Richards, A School Retooled, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2010, at 1A (reporting that 
the state acquiesces to a charter’s claims that its links to a closed Christian “private school are 
superficial” even though it “has the same founder, is staffed by many of the same teachers and 
attended by many of the same students” and uses the same building). 
 378 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602(b) (West 2012) (forbidding the conversion of private 
schools to charter schools; also “[n]o charter school shall receive any public funds for a pupil if 
the pupil also attends a private school that charges the pupil’s family for tuition”). 
 379 See supra notes 356–357. 
 380 See Mead, supra note 47, at 356–57. 
 381 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602(a) (West 2012); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 11968 (West 
2013); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27A-4(b) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 2852(9) (McKinney 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(g) (2012). See generally CTR. FOR 
EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STATES 2012, at 8–9 (Alison Consoletti 
ed., 13th ed. 2012), available at http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CER_
2012_Charter_Laws.pdf. 
 382 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 162, 214 (“[Davey] authorizes discriminatory funding, but it 
does not authorize discriminatory regulation.”). 
 383 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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prism of free speech applies naturally to the chartering context. 
Operating a charter school, like the use of public school property or the 
publication of magazines under university auspices, is open to all under 
neutral principles.384 The regulatory apparatus of charter schooling 
bears a strong family resemblance to the detailed but neutral rules that 
governed university subsidies for student publication in Rosenberger.385 
And, again, the issue is not discrimination against religion per se but 
against views and practices tinged with religion. With respect to such 
elements of a charter program, viewpoint neutrality might well be a 
constitutional requirement. 
In short, the institution of chartering itself, through its reliance on 
private providers and its choice of regulation rather than bureaucracy as 
the method of state control, creates a great deal of room for creative 
businesspeople to satisfy the demand for religious education, especially 
at the margin. Even if the claim that charters may be religious is 
rejected, chartering still has the potential to bring about a monumental 
shift in the relationship between church and state in American 
education. Where in a Progressive world government could enforce 
American schools characterized by strict separation, in a neoliberal one 
demand in the marketplace inevitably makes such boundaries more 
porous. 
V.     THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
AND PUBLIC SUBSIDY 
Neoliberalism is not the first, last, or biggest shift in educational 
and religious cultures to affect the tortuous course of the relationship 
between American religion and American schools. Nevertheless, it is 
surely significant. The rise of chartering creates the opportunity for 
substantial public funds to flow to religious and quasi-religious schools. 
The outsize importance of both church and school in American society, 
and the richness of America’s history of interaction between them,386 
make it impossible fully to predict the consequences of this momentous 
change. In this brief conclusion, I suggest only that there are (at least) 
four important places to look. 
First, more American pupils will receive religious and religiously 
inflected education. Some states will likely allow religious charters and 
quasi-religious ones will seek students nationwide. The rise of these 
 
 384 Id. at 830; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 
(1993). 
 385 515 U.S. at 823–25. 
 386 See GREEN, BIBLE, SCHOOL, AND CONSTITUTION, supra note 80, at 225–27, 251–325; 
GORDON, supra note 15; JONES, supra note 12. 
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schools reduces the effective price of religious education. This will 
benefit some families already paying for religious schooling, but a 
greater impact will be felt among families whose budget constraints lead 
them to prefer traditional public schools over paying tuition. These 
families are the natural target market for religious charter 
entrepreneurs. Suppliers will seek to bundle religious content, cultural 
aspects of religious schooling, and secular programs in ways that will be 
attractive to these families. How they do so, and to a lesser extent how 
states regulate their efforts, will determine much about the kind of 
schooling that many American students receive. 
Chartering is also a harbinger of great challenge for traditional 
private religious schools. Private schools, especially religious ones, have 
long been a locus for dissent over public schooling and play a pivotal 
role in American education and in the national conversation over 
educational values.387 This vital sector will have to respond to its new 
competitive environment.388 Existing religious schools, like any private 
business, focus particularly on their marginal consumers, the group that 
will be targeted by new competition from charters. The early anecdotes 
of private schools converting to charters389 suggest that one response is 
contraction, with schools accepting more regulation and less overt 
religiosity in exchange for state subsidy; but this will hardly be the only 
or even the modal change. The kind of religious education that private 
religious schools offer will also shift. It was hoped that neoliberalism 
would induce change in traditional public schools by introducing 
competition into their environment; for similar reasons it will change 
the religious school sector. Not all such changes will be universally 
welcomed throughout the existing private-school industry. 
The third potential effect of religious chartering is to alter the 
dynamic by which certain American communities of faith understand 
themselves to be alienated and excluded from the enterprise of public 
education.390 These communities never reconciled themselves to court 
decisions regarding school prayer, Bible reading, and the teaching of 
evolution.391 Religious chartering makes room for a reorientation of 
 
 387 See CARPER & HUNT, supra note 14; JONES, supra note 12, at 101. 
 388 See JONES, supra note 12, at 21 (noting the impact of “‘free,’ nonsectarian public schools” 
upon denominational schools in the nineteenth century). 
 389 See supra notes 328–343, 370–371 and accompanying text. 
 390 See JONES, supra note 12, at 165 (“[S]ome Protestants, though certainly not all, have 
joined segments of the Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim communities on the institutional sidelines 
of American education.”); Carper & Hunt, supra note 80, at 85–86. 
 391 See MICHAEL BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, EVOLUTION, CREATIONISM, AND THE BATTLE 
TO CONTROL AMERICA’S CLASSROOMS 13–16 (2010) (collecting bibliography); BRUCE J. 
DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: HOW ENGLE V. VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 
189 (2007); Clyde Wilcox & Sam Potolicchio, The Christian Right and Church-State Issues, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 387, 391 (Derek H. Davis 
ed., 2010). 
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school politics, in which religious groups become both more supportive 
of and more involved in “public” schooling as an enterprise.392 This 
might well lead to new thinking about how religious and secular 
schooling could better reflect shared democratic values and public 
purpose.393 Again, such reorientations will encourage some and chagrin 
others. 
Finally, religious charter schools will blur boundaries among 
school, church, and public sector, institutions which in a Progressive era 
were more nearly discrete. Parents and broader society will increasingly 
understand the choice of religious schooling not as opting out but as 
one way of fully participating in the civic enterprise of education.394 
What religious charters do not portend is any substantial shift in 
Americans’ understanding of the First Amendment or its application to 
schools. When it prohibited formal school prayer in 1963, the Supreme 
Court declared that “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
[and] to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials. . . . One’s right to . . . freedom of worship . . . and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections.”395 These principles are fully respected in a 
neoliberal world where religious and secular groups alike charter 
schools that they desire and that they believe consumers in the 
educational marketplace will prefer. 
 
 
 392 See GORDON, supra note 15, at 56–57. 
 393 See id. at 59–80; JONES, supra note 12, at 101–10; David Sikkink, Conservative 
Protestants, Schooling, and Democracy, in 1 EVANGELICALS AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276, 
279 (Steven Brint & Jean Reith Schroedel eds., 2009). 
 394 See Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious 
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1299–1302 (2002); supra note 5 
and accompanying text. 
 395 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
